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PreFACe 
The Purple Book 20121 presents a discouraging outlook for the trustees and 
sponsoring employers of UK private sector defined benefit (DB) pension 
schemes. Scheme funding on an s179 basis2 deteriorated significantly between 
March 2011 and March 2012, with the funding ratio (assets divided by liabilities) 
falling from 100% to 83%. S179 liabilities were estimated at £1,026.8bn with an 
aggregate deficit of £204bn, double the figure in 2011. The aggregate buy-
out deficit in 2012 was £675.8bn, compared with £467bn the previous year, 
representing a fall in the full buy-out funding position from 67% to 60%. The 
stark result is that DB deficits persist in stalling corporate activities and threaten 
to force otherwise viable companies into liquidation.
Against this gloomy backdrop, the de-risking market for DB schemes’ liabilities, 
which began in 2006, has developed rapidly and is predicted to grow further in 
2013 and beyond. The Purple Book reports that the value of risk-transfer deals 
such as longevity-only deals, bulk buy-ins and bulk buy-outs, had reached about 
£40bn by the end of March 2012. It also states that almost 40% of s179 liabilities 
relate to pensioner members, which is the main focus for the longevity swaps 
and bulk buy-in market. According to the most recent analysis from Towers 
Watson, ‘bulk annuity buy-ins alone could exceed £5bn in 2013’.3
Nevertheless, at present all de-risking deals completed to date represent only 
about 3% of DB liabilities. The market, therefore, is not even keeping pace with 
schemes’ increasing liabilities, which means that it is not reducing the aggregate 
risk, but only serving to slow the rate of growth of these liabilities. Clearly, 
innovation and new players are required to expand the capacity and range of 
de-risking strategies and, importantly, to extend their availability to DB schemes 
of all sizes and profiles.
This report examines the most recent innovation in the de-risking market for 
pensioner sections – medically-underwritten (or enhanced) bulk buy-ins. It is 
published as news of the first completed cases were made available to us (in 
January 2013), details of which can be found in Section 3. 
The strategic goal of employers and trustees with closed DB schemes is to 
wind-up the scheme through a full buy-out, usually starting with the pensioner 
section. For reasons we explain in Section 1, even where a scheme is ready 
to transact a buy-out, the first stage is typically a buy-in. As one of the case 
studies we examine demonstrates, a competitive price achieved through medical 
underwriting can enable trustees to proceed from buy-in to buy-out very rapidly 
1 The Purple Book is published jointly by the Pensions Regulator and the Pension Protection Fund 
(http://www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/docs/purple-book-2012.pdf). When an eligible DB scheme 
transfers into the PPF, the PPF generally pays a starting level of compensation of 100% of pensioners’ 
benefits and 90% of benefits (subject to a compensation cap of £34,049 in 2012) for active and 
deferred members. Pension increases under the PPF are also capped. The 2012 Purple Book dataset 
covers 6,316 PPF-eligible DB schemes. This represents about 98% of the estimated total number of 
schemes and over 99% of estimated total liabilities.
2 The s179 basis values the liabilities in the pension scheme at the PPF level of compensation.
3 http://www.towerswatson.com/united-kingdom/press/8807 
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– in this case within a matter of weeks. Therefore the development of new 
underwriting techniques for bulk purchase annuities (BPAs), together with the 
entry of new insurers that bring expertise from the thriving individual enhanced 
annuity market in relation to defined contribution (DC) schemes, brings 
increased potential to the de-risking market at a critical time. 
As this report explains, an enhanced bulk buy-in is where the trustees buy a 
bulk annuity as an investment of the scheme, where some or all of the members 
covered by the policy are medically underwritten. Medical underwriting, which is 
now commonplace in the individual annuity market, has the potential to reduce 
the cost to the scheme of the annuity income match, compared with standard 
annuities, on the basis that certain members might have lower than average life 
expectancy. 
For trustees and employers, medically-underwritten annuities can bring cost 
savings to a de-risking approach that offers an effective  hedge against a 
range of risks, including interest rate, inflation, investment and longevity risks. 
This report examines the rationale for these strategies, the impact on residual 
liabilities and future de-risking exercises, and, more broadly, the potential 
impact on the de-risking market as a whole of the introduction of new pricing 
techniques and new players. 
The Pensions Institute has a long tradition of high-quality research on longevity, 
mortality and morbidity issues. Drawing on these resources, the report evaluates 
the merits of medically underwritten de-risking exercises, the types of scheme 
likely to be targeted in 2013, the profile of schemes most likely to benefit, 
and the expertise and processes required for a successful transaction. Given 
the apparent potential of the enhanced bulk buy-in market, we also consider 
the need for consistent regulation across the trust-based and contract-based 
pensions markets, and we recommend the development of a code of practice  
by participants in conjunction with the government, the Pensions Regulator (tPR) 
and the new Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Prudential Regulatory 
Authority (PRA), which replace the Financial Services Authority in April 2013. This 
will be of particular assistance to smaller employers and trustees – the present 
target market – and also to their advisers. The relevant advisory community 
often represents the smaller local and regional firms of actuarial consultants and 
independent financial advisers (IFAs), which might lack the expertise necessary 
to engage with this complex and rapidly evolving corporate finance market. Such 
a regulatory regime and code would help to ensure that the market reaches its 
full potential and at the same time protects the interests of trustees, sponsoring 
employers and scheme members, as well as participating financial institutions 
and advisers. 
We would like to thank the many organisations that helped with this research in 
terms of access to documentation, permission to publish extracts from reports, 
and, in particular, participation in the extensive series of interviews that informed 
our analysis of current and expected future market practice. The organisations 
that were happy to be named are listed in the acknowledgements. Where we 
quote from a published report, the relevant organisation is credited. Where we 
quote from interviews, the comments are anonymised. This technique, pioneered 
by the Pensions Institute for its practitioner reports, enables us to express the 
views of actual and potential market stakeholders more candidly and more fully 
than might otherwise be the case.
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executive summary 
1.  impact on pricing: Details of the first completed bulk purchase annuities 
(BPAs) that applied medical underwriting techniques emerged in January 
2013. These and other case studies in this report demonstrate that with 
judicious medical underwriting an enhanced BPA can offer schemes savings of 
about 10% – much  more in certain cases – relative to the cost of conventional 
underwriting. The differential is dependent on the number of members who 
qualify for enhancements – in particular the number of members with the 
larger liabilities – and the degree of their life-shortening conditions.
2.  impact on scheme security: The strategy brings a new morbidity/mortality 
pricing technique to the bulk buy-in market, which already offers an effective 
hedge against a range of risks, such as those relating to interest rates, 
inflation, investment and longevity. Members see no change in their pension 
payments, but in certain cases – for example where the employer covenant 
is weak – they should benefit from an improvement in scheme security, 
due to the addition of the insurance company’s covenant. This covenant is 
supported by the regulation of solvency and capital adequacy, and is backed 
by a compensation system.
3.  impact on the bulk purchase annuity market: The combination of 
new players from the DC enhanced annuity market, together with the 
existing stalwarts of the DB BPA market, is expected to bring the line-up 
of enhanced underwriters to four at the beginning of 2013. It is possible 
that in 2013-14 some of the conventional insurers will develop their own 
medical underwriting services or strike up deals with specialists in order to 
remain competitive. This would represent a radical new trend in DB scheme 
de-risking, whereby the pricing of risk is much better quantified using 
sophisticated medical underwriting techniques.
4.  impact on full bulk buy-outs: A bulk buy-in is an essential process in the 
transition to a bulk buy-out. It is likely to be the biggest investment decision 
trustees will make before arranging  bulk buy-outs for the pensioner section 
and then for the remaining sections of the scheme, leading to scheme wind-
up. Unlike other investments, the bulk buy-in – whether transacted on a 
standard or enhanced basis – is generally irreversible, so the counter-party 
risk must be considered very carefully. Moreover, the deal will shape the 
final bulk buy-out package, when annuities held as assets of the scheme 
are transferred to individual members. Accuracy of income-matching and 
pricing at the buy-in stage, therefore, is essential to the longer-term goals of 
trustees and corporate sponsors.
5.  Potential size of enhanced bulk buy-in market: The current focus for 
enhanced bulk buy-ins is smaller schemes with up to 400 pensioners. Taking 
a conservative view of the potential market, based on data in the Purple 
Book 2012, there are more than 5,000 schemes in this market, representing 
about 350,000 pensioners in aggregate and assets under management of 
about £40bn. This represents just over 10% of the assets under management 
(AUM) in relation to pensioner sections in the total market, indicating that if 
the enhanced bulk buy-in can be developed to cater for all sizes of pensioner 
sections, the market would represent AUM of about £380bn.
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towards a Consistent regulatory Framework and Code  
of Practice 
For reasons that are made clear in this report, there is a need for greater 
regulatory consistency in the market and a code of practice that enables it to 
develop safely and efficiently for schemes of all sizes.
1. Consistent regulation is required across the dB and annuity markets 
An enhanced bulk purchase annuity (BPA) applies solutions developed for 
the DC market to DB schemes, which means that trustees and advisers need 
to be familiar with the dual regulatory system – tPR and the FSA – which 
becomes tripartite in April 2013, when the FSA is replaced with the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA). The 
Memorandum of Understanding between the FSA and tPR, agreed in 2005 and 
updated in 2007, precedes the development of the BPA market. We suggest 
that it should be updated urgently to address this oversight and the changes 
introduced by the move to separate conduct and prudential regulators for 
financial services. 
2. A code of practice and stakeholder guidance are required, agreed 
between the government, the regulators and stakeholders in the market,  
to safeguard the interests of trustees, employers and members. 
We recommend that the code and guidance should consider the following 
issues: 
a.  Accurate data: At the macro level, the research for this report indicates that 
different sources of de-risking transaction market data are inconsistent with 
each other. tPR reports with a lag on de-risking activity through the Purple 
Book, while market participants – insurers, and in particular consultants – 
publish reports periodically that present quite different figures on the number 
and size of transactions. An orderly market requires clear and consistent 
data. At the micro-level, equally essential to the success of the market is the 
insurer’s access to members’ medical data, which in turn requires member 
cooperation and motivation. Enhanced underwriting techniques have only 
been available to DB schemes for about 12 months, yet already there are 
three different approaches evident. We suggest that competing insurers 
agree a fair and effective way to collaborate and to share both quantitative 
and qualitative information about the market. This might also enable 
participants to identify emerging problems before they become a  
regulatory issue. 
b.  Flexibility in member data collection processes: Some insurers medically 
underwrite all lives in the pensioner cohort; others focus on those members 
for whom the liabilities are most concentrated. Some insurers collect 
member data via a short questionnaire, general practitioner (GP) reports, or 
a combination of these two processes. At least one insurer uses telephone 
interviews as its sole process. All of these methods appear to have their 
merits, but for a competitive market to develop, trustees need insurers to 
be flexible, so that they can select the best data collection method for the 
scheme profile without being forced to pre-select an insurer that uses only 
one specific underwriting and data-collection process.
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c.  Trustee disclosure: At present trustees, knowingly or unwittingly, might not 
disclose to insurers facts material to the underwriting process, particularly 
where current or previous de-risking exercises have involved medical 
underwriting on a bulk or individual member basis. The result of this lack of 
full disclosure could lead to legal disputes, with insurers suing trustees for 
damages. At present the onus appears to rest with insurers to ask trustees 
the right questions. A common disclosure process would eliminate concerns 
about anti-selection issues. 
d.  Standard procedures on the death of an annuitant: An important issue 
for insurers is the procedure trustees adopt on the death of a member, for 
whom they have arranged an annuity as part of a bulk arrangement held 
as a scheme asset. This is especially important if the scheme that holds 
annuities as assets enters the PPF. An ABI and NAPF report published in 
September 2011, ‘Bulk Insured Pensions: A Good Practice Guide’4 said 
‘the trustees may want to ensure that the bulk buy-in policy caters for the 
possibility of the scheme entering a PPF assessment period’. We endorse  
this approach and suggest that it be made standard practice.
e.  Expertise of trustees, employers, and smaller firms of advisers: Evidence 
from tPR indicates that trustee knowledge and understanding can be poor 
among smaller schemes. Trustees, naturally, would seek independent and 
impartial advice concerning any proposed enhanced bulk buy-in, but it is 
essential that they understand the potential liabilities they face if the insured 
benefits purchased are insufficient to meet the scheme benefits payable, 
particularly as they move from bulk buy-in to a buy-out. They should also 
check how these transactions are covered in their trustee liability insurance. 
  We further recommend that the regulators incorporate guidance to trustees 
and employers on their websites about the BPA market as a whole and about 
medical underwriting, its opportunities and also its risks. 
  Guidance is also needed for advisers to smaller schemes, as frequently 
this service is provided by regional or local firms of IFAs and actuarial 
consultants, which might lack expertise in what is a new, complex and 
rapidly developing market.
4  http://www.abi.org.uk/Publications/58274.pdf 
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section 1: enhanced Bulk Buy-ins in Context 
1.1 The relationship between a bulk buy-in and a bulk buy-out
A bulk buy-in is generally considered to be a pre-requisite for a buy-out. In 
some cases, the buy-in might be treated as a long-term asset of the scheme, but 
in others, it might be the intention from the outset to arrange a bulk buy-out, 
as in the case study presented at the start of Section 3. In the latter case, we 
understand the scheme and provider might describe the transaction as a buy-out.
A bulk buy-in is an asset of the scheme, purchased to hedge pensioners’ income 
streams in relation to interest rate, inflation and longevity risks. Buy-out pricing 
demands absolute precision in this match on an individual basis, since the 
transaction results in the assignment to each pensioner of an individual annuity 
that is underwritten solely by the insurer (i.e., the trustees have discharged all 
liability for these individuals, who are no longer scheme members). To ensure 
this precise match, insurers told us that there needs to be a period of time – 
created by the buy-in phase – when the insurer and trustees consolidate the data 
and ensure absolute accuracy. The consolidation process might take just a few 
weeks, where a small number of pensioners are involved; in large transactions it 
could take several months or even a year. 
1.2 The conventional defined benefit de-risking market 
The BPA market has been around for several decades, but until 2006 it was 
dominated by two insurance companies: Legal & General and Prudential. Of 
the new players that entered in or after 2006, Synesis pulled out in 2008 and 
Lucida closed to new business in June 2012.5 Probably the biggest surprise came 
in 2011, when Paternoster – the company which started the new market – was 
bought by Goldman Sachs. It now operates as a sister company to Rothesay Life. 
Despite these upheavals, de-risking business has been brisk over the past three 
to four years with the market commentators reporting a significant increase 
in the size of BPA and longevity swap deals.6 According to Lane Clark and 
Peacock’s (LCP’s) April 2012 report on BPA  and longevity swap deals,7 record 
levels of activity in 2011 brought total market volumes to £40bn since 2006, with 
£12.3bn worth of business transacted during 2011 alone; a 50% year-on-year 
increase. LCP said: 
This influx of new business to insurers means that over 500,000 DB members now 
benefit from the protections of an insurance policy – either through a buy-in policy 
held by the scheme trustees or a buy-out policy in the member’s own name – with 
numbers increasing by about 100,000 a year.
5 At the time of writing, it was in the process of selling its back book to another provider.
6 See, for example, http://www.towerswatson.com/assets/pdf/6871/TW-EU-2012-25152-Risk-
Transfer-Report.pdf,  http://www.lcp.uk.com/media/522776/lcp_pensioner_buy-in_for_smaller_
transactions.pdf, http://www.aon.com/unitedkingdom/mid-market/mid-market-survey.jsp, http://
www.metlife.co.uk/mal/documents/1_News_PRBI_2012.pdf 
7 http://www.lcp.uk.com/news--publications/publications-and-research/2012/lcp-pension-buy-ins-
buy-outs-and-longevity-swaps-2012/?alttemplate=downloadRegistration 
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Meanwhile, Towers Watson expects the buy-in market alone to be worth in 
excess of £5bn in 2013.
Yet the market remains small relative to aggregate scheme liabilities: to date 
de-risking transactions account for about 3% of total liabilities (i.e., £40bn out 
of a total of £1340.5bn) and just short of 10% of pensioner liabilities (£380bn). 
Without innovation in pricing it seems unlikely that the market would be able to 
match the potential appetite of trustees and employers. 
The attractions of the conventional bulk buy-in can be summarised as follows:8
1. The bulk buy-in represents an important step towards a bulk buy-out, which 
might take place within weeks of the buy-in (where the buy-out is the ultimate 
objective from the outset). It might also represent a long-term asset of the scheme. 
2. It hedges interest-rate, inflation, investment and longevity risk for the liabilities 
covered.
3. It has no material profit and loss (P&L) impact for the sponsoring company 
under international accounting standards.
4. Annuities are long-term insurance contracts. The FSA (FCA and PRA from 
April 2013) regulates insurance companies and requires them to demonstrate 
their solvency and capital adequacy on an annual basis. This confers a high 
level of security for the scheme’s counter-party (annuity provider) risk. 
5. Back-up from the sponsoring employer remains as an additional member 
protection. Moreover,  insurance companies tend to de-risk their own balance 
sheets through reinsurance companies, which buy longevity risk from insurance 
companies and investment banks operating in the longevity risk transfer market. 
If reinsurance is in place, the insurance company remains fully liable to meet 
the terms of the contract with the trustees, even if a reinsurance company it used 
subsequently defaults.
6. In the event of an insurance company defaulting, the Financial Services 
Compensation Scheme (FSCS) pays 90% of the annuity income with no upper 
limit.9 The FSCS covers all business conducted by firms authorised by the FSA 
(FCA/PRA), including BPAs. It is funded by levies on authorised firms.10 
7. All scheme members are treated equitably, both on an ongoing basis and on 
wind-up. For example, the payments under a bulk buy-in can be restructured 
to comply with the statutory priority order, if required, which is a key trustee 
concern.
8. Administration usually is retained by the trustees, so members see no change 
in the way their pensions are paid.
8 This list is partly drawn from LCP’s ‘Pensioner buy-in for smaller transactions’, March 2012  
(http://www.lcp.uk.com/media/522776/lcp_pensioner_buy-in_for_smaller_transactions.pdf)
9  http://www.pensionsadvisoryservice.org.uk/security-of-pensions/financial-services-compensation-
scheme 
10 http://www.fscs.org.uk/industry/funding/ 
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9. A pensioner bulk buy-in currently costs 0% to 5% above the typical funding 
reserve for pensioners (although depending on the relative strength of the 
assumptions underlying the funding reserve, it can be outside of this range).
10. Typically funding strains are very modest, which means that additional 
company contributions may not be required, even where there is a deficit.
1.3 Medical underwriting: a natural progression
The introduction of medical underwriting in the bulk buy-in market represents a 
natural progression or refinement of a trend already well-established in the BPA 
market. It used to be the case that a conventional BPA did not take pensioners’ 
health and socio-demographic status into account, but today the underwriter 
considers the industry sector and also a range of data from the trustees which 
can provide a reasonable indication of members’ expected longevity. Standard 
scheme data that would be available to all insurers include age, sex, size of 
pension, and postcode. 
It is possible that the scheme’s mortality assumptions do not reflect the true 
socio-economic profile of the pensioners. An example might be where the 
employer is in the manufacturing sector, where the impact of a lifetime in 
manual work is known to affect longevity. B&CE, until recently best known for 
its industry-wide DC scheme for the building and construction sector, states that 
about 60% of these members qualify for an enhancement and also that early 
retirement due to ill-health is very common. 
While postcode underwriting helps to identify the member’s socio-economic 
status, interviewees said that it can be a blunt tool. Moreover, recent research 
suggests that it is the size of pension, rather than the occupation that is the more 
accurate indicator of mortality. In May 2012, Mercer announced11 that it was 
advising smaller pension schemes to review their mortality data in the light of 
new figures published by Continuous Mortality Investigation (CMI),12 a research 
group of the Actuarial Profession. The CMI’s research highlighted the wide 
variation of mortality experience among members of different pension schemes 
in the UK. Mercer observed:
The research [from the CMI] shows a wide fluctuation in mortality rates both 
between industry sectors and within each industry sector. For example, overall 
mortality rates in the financial sector are around 20% less than the rates calculated by 
schemes in basic industries, such as mining and paper. However, within the financial 
sector, members receiving pensions of less than £1,500 a year were almost twice 
as likely to die earlier than pensioners receiving over £25,000 each year. The data 
suggests that working in the same industry could be less relevant to life expectancy 
than the level of pension received, which itself is likely to be just a proxy for the socio-
economic group an individual belongs to. 
11  http://uk.mercer.com/press-releases/Mortality-assumptions-for-small-pension-schemes-need-
review 
12 http://www.actuaries.org.uk/research-and-resources/pages/continuous-mortality-investigation-
latest-publications
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However, pension size, while useful, might also be misleading. Given modern 
working patterns, a small pension might indeed indicate a low standard of living 
and, hence, possibly lower life expectancy, but the member might also have 
several other company pensions and sources of private retirement income.  
Medical underwriting was introduced in the individual annuity market in the 
UK in the mid-1990s and is now an established technique. In 2011 enhanced 
individual annuity sales rose to more than £3bn, an increase of 22% over 2010, 
according to Towers Watson.13 This trend is expected to continue.
Enhanced annuities are based on medical underwriting techniques that take 
account of the individual’s lifestyle and health. Where these factors indicate a 
lower than average lifespan, the price of the annuity, in respect of an individual 
life in a bulk buy-in, might be 10-40% lower than the price of a standard annuity 
where there is no medical underwriting and which, therefore, reflects ‘average’ 
health. 
2012 saw the first enhanced buy-ins in the process of being placed and the 
details of what we understand are the first completed deals were provided to 
us in January 2013 (See 3.1). For the BPA market as a whole, the line-up at the 
beginning of 2013 looks like this:
•	  Aviva: Targets schemes up to £50m with no minimum. Main focus is 
pensioners, but will accept deferreds. Thought to be able to offer medical 
underwriting for individual pensioners.
•	  Just Retirement: Enhanced specialist from the DC market targeting pensioner 
sections of up to c. 400; entered the market formally in late 2012.
•	  Legal & General: No stated minimum; targets pensioners and deferreds; 
offers enhanced annuities for selected lives via its Large Individual Defined 
Benefit Annuity (LIDBA) service.
•	  MetLife: Minimum £2-5m. Main focus is pensioners, but will accept 
deferreds. Currently no medical underwriting capabilities.
•	  Partnership: Enhanced specialist from the DC market targeting pensioner 
sections of c. 10-400; entered market formally in early 2012.
•	  Pensions Insurance Corporation (PIC): Minimum c. £10m; main focus is 
pensioners, but will accept actives and deferreds. Currently no medical 
underwriting capabilities
•	  Prudential: Large schemes only (possibly minimum of c. £100m). Pensioners 
only. Currently no medical underwriting capabilities.
•	  Rothesay Life: Large schemes only (possibly a minimum of c. £100m). 
Pensioners and deferreds accepted. Currently no medical underwriting 
capabilities.
•	  Potential new entrants: In addition to the insurers noted above, there are 
others who do not want to be identified that we understand are considering 
entry to the bulk buy-in market.
13  http://www.towerswatson.com/united-kingdom/press/6451 
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Interest on the part of insurers in medical underwriting has been matched by a 
corresponding interest on the part of consultants. Several of the national firms 
have formally extended their BPA services to incorporate enhanced underwriting 
techniques. We are aware of specialist services offered, for example, by Barnett 
Waddingham, Hymans Robertson, JLT, and LCP, but we understand that most 
consultants with recognised capabilities in the BPA market offer the ability to 
broker a medically-underwritten BPA. 
Typically, ‘streamlined’ enhanced consultancy services are based on 
arrangements with one or more insurance companies, which agree to provide 
pre-negotiated and potentially enhanced contracts, streamlined quotations, and, 
in some cases, a fixed fee that includes legal advice from a recognised law firm. 
Consultants say that pre-negotiated contracts with insurers provide immediate 
access to an enhanced contract (that is, compared to insurers’ standard terms) 
and that this avoids the potentially lengthy and costly negotiations required to 
secure similar terms in the open market, which can slow down the process and, 
with volatile markets, risk the deal failing due to bad market timing. This type 
of service is likely to guarantee trustee confidentiality in relation to any medical 
data that is obtained from members: the confidentiality clause is protected 
through the consultant’s non-disclosure agreements with insurers, so that only 
the insurance company has access to the data. 
One of the biggest concerns for trustees and employers is the risk that a 
transaction fails, which leaves the scheme – and, directly or indirectly, the 
employer – out of pocket. According to LCP14, across the market as a whole, 
fewer than 20% of bulk buy-in quotations lead to a completed transaction. 
Market timing is a key issue for all de-risking transactions, but might be 
particularly so for medically underwritten BPAs due to the time it might take to 
secure information from individual members about their health and lifestyle. 
1.4 Why smaller schemes? 
Consultants, insurance companies and independent trustees, among others, 
differ in their views of the optimal scheme size for an enhanced bulk buy-in, but 
the general consensus at the time of writing was that the strategy is suitable for 
schemes with a maximum of about 400. The explanation for the upper limit is not 
based on actuarial calculations, but is the result of a trade-off between a range 
of factors including feasibility, trustee knowledge of the retired membership,  
‘random variation risk’, covenant risk-hedging, and economies of scale. 
We were informed that the evidence so far indicates that member response rates 
to the request for medical information are closest to 100% for schemes with 
fewer than 400 pensioners. In other words, the medical underwriting exercise is 
not – at present – considered feasible in schemes with larger pensioner sections. 
Since the market is so new, the evidence is limited, but we expect to see more 
robust quantitative data emerge over the next year or so, as completed cases 
become available for closer scrutiny. 
14  Pensioner buy-in for smaller transactions http://www.lcp.uk.com/media/522776/lcp_pensioner_
buy-in_for_smaller_transactions.pdf
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Of the reasons cited for the current upper limit in the size of the pensioner cohort, 
trustee knowledge, is considered the most important qualitative factor. This is 
because in a small scheme, the trustees might have a good understanding of the 
liability profile of the pensioner section under consideration, since they are likely 
to know many of the pensioners personally, and vice versa. Such relationships 
can be particularly helpful if the trustees are to persuade members to provide 
medical information. Moreover, consultants and providers say they prefer to 
deal with comparatively small tranches of pensioners since it is easier – in terms 
of time and resources – to make contact with individual members to secure the 
medical information required for accurate quotation purposes. 
In addition, a small scheme will experience substantial random variation risk, 
which means that deaths are much more difficult to predict. By contrast, in big 
schemes, the law of large numbers serves to make death rates more predictable 
and so, in theory, reduces the potential benefits from medical underwriting. 
A point we found very persuasive in this debate is the way in which a BPA can 
improve scheme security for certain smaller schemes (where these represent 
the legacy schemes of smaller employers, as opposed to the legacy schemes 
of large corporates acquired through M&A activity). In some cases, smaller 
employers have comparatively weak covenants, as might be the case, for 
example, where liabilities are significant relative to the company balance 
sheet and where the employer is in a declining industry, such as traditional 
manufacturing, particularly where the company has a single line of business. In 
this case, the addition of the insurance company covenant can strengthen the 
overall long-term security of the scheme, which benefits all parties including 
the members. As one interviewee put it, ‘for schemes in this situation, sharing 
covenant risk is a no-brainer’. We stress, however, that this point only applies 
to weaker employer covenants – for many smaller employers, the scheme 
liabilities are modest relative to the balance sheet and the funding levels are 
comparatively robust. 
Large corporates with well-diversified businesses might have a very strong 
covenant, in which case diversification across covenants is unlikely to be an 
objective. However, trustees might consider whether the insurance company’s 
‘covenant hedge’ is valuable for specific reasons – for example, where the 
insurer covenant hedges economic risks, due to its UK or global business model 
and its reinsurance arrangements, to which the employer itself is vulnerable.
Last, but not least on this point, there is the issue of economies of scale, i.e., the 
cost of running a pension scheme for smaller companies can represent a very 
inefficient use of resources. We suggest, however, that other factors might also 
come into play during this early stage in the market’s development. For example, 
the preference for smaller schemes might be due in part to the business models 
of insurance companies new to this market segment. Although they might have 
significant expertise in medical underwriting, their balance sheets might be 
relatively small which could limit their capacity for taking on large schemes, even 
where they reinsure most or all of the longevity risk, as is common practice. 
A further factor is the close alignment between the trustee’s and corporate 
sponsor’s objectives in smaller schemes. For reasons that are not fully 
understood, schemes with fewer than 100 members – the smallest tPR category 
used in the Purple Book – tend to be better funded on a s179 valuation basis 
than larger schemes (92% funded in schemes with fewer than 100 members, 
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compared with 80% for the 100-999 category and 78% for the 1000-9999 
category)15. This might be because smaller schemes may have taken less 
investment risk than larger schemes, which means that they might not have 
suffered as badly from the collapse in equity markets, and, moreover, might have 
benefitted from the rally in gilt values associated with quantitative easing (QE). 
Furthermore, given the size of these schemes, the sponsors might have been able 
to fund any deficit that has arisen more quickly than their larger counterparts and 
be in a position to make good any deficit over shorter time horizons.
Although the initial interest has been in the small schemes of small employers, in 
theory the market could extend to cover small-scale transactions involving larger 
employers. Larger schemes might consider enhanced bulk buy-ins where they 
decide to de-risk in a series of transactions that involve cohorts of pensioners 
rather than the entire pensioner section. The reason for this might be the 
preference to stagger the funding, but it might also be because the trustees and 
their consultant feel that the phased approach mitigates the risks associated with 
market timing. The main drawback of this approach is that multiple transactions 
might increase the overall cost of de-risking, while there is a risk that the method 
of determining the membership covered by each transaction might give rise to 
the perception of anti-selection risk by insurers. 
Alternatively, where the bulk buy-in relates to a large pensioner section, the 
consultant might suggest that only a small number of lives are medically 
underwritten (this appears to be the approach of one of the insurers in the 
market). In many cases, the retired company directors and executives appear to 
account for a disproportionately large share of liabilities. Several interviewees 
referred to the ‘Pareto principle’ or ‘80-20 rule’, where 80% of the liabilities 
relate to 20% of the lives. We are not aware of any statistical evidence 
confirming this principle in the context of the medical underwriting of pension 
liabilities, but nevertheless the high-liability cohort might be the focus of medical 
underwriting in a larger scheme, especially if some of the directors are known 
to be in poor health. Under this scenario, the remaining members might be 
underwritten on a standard basis, but this would need to be by the same insurer, 
since otherwise anti-selection issues would come into play. 
In the light of the above, while we believe that enhanced underwriting might be 
applicable to all schemes in future – depending on whether they seek medical 
underwriting for every pensioner or just the high-liability members – in this 
report we concentrate on smaller schemes, rather than smaller transactions, 
since this is the most likely focus of market interest in the short-term. Having 
said that, in the tables below, we also indicate the full potential of the enhanced 
de-risking market on the assumption that in due course consultants and insurers 
will be able to develop medical underwriting services and processes that can be 
applied to larger schemes.
A further factor to consider is that small ‘scheme’ is not necessarily synonymous 
with small employer. The primary market at present is the schemes of smaller 
companies, where this is their main or only DB arrangement. This market relates 
to the first two categories of schemes for data purposes in the 2012 Purple Book: 
those with fewer than 100 members and those with fewer than 1000 members.  
However, a second market might be located in larger corporates, many of 
15  Based on data in the first table on p. 99 of the Purple Book 2012. 
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which have small legacy schemes due to M&A activities. For these schemes, in 
many respects the underwriting approach is the same as for the main category 
described above. However, it might be the case that the corporate sponsor is 
particularly keen to de-risk legacy schemes, while consultants and insurers can 
reasonably expect a higher level of sophistication in the main trustee board, 
which might already be more familiar with, and open to, de-risking propositions.
1.5 How many smaller schemes are there?
As mentioned above, tPR categorises schemes according to total membership 
(5-99, 100-999, etc),16 but it also provides a breakdown of membership 
categories that includes the number of pensioners. To estimate the number of 
schemes with up to 400 pensioners, we first considered the relative proportions 
of active/deferred members and pensioners. The average is 65% and 35% 
respectively, but there can be wide variations: for some schemes, the percentage 
of pensioners is at least 45%. 
We understand that this variation is due to a range of factors. For example, 
the scheme-specific ratio is likely to reflect the date on which the scheme was 
established and when it was closed (assuming it is closed – a small minority are 
still open). Most DB schemes among smaller companies were established in the 
late-1970s and early-1980s, following the government’s introduction of attractive 
terms for contracting out of the State Earnings Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) 
in 1978, which offered significant national insurance (NI) contribution reductions 
for employees and employers. This triggered a major push on the part of 
advisers and consultants to promote DB to smaller employers that previously had 
considered this option too expensive and too complicated.
DB funding problems first emerged formally at the turn of the present century. 
These were triggered by a range of factors, including the end of the equity 
bull market, the introduction of new and significantly less favourable mortality 
assumptions, and changes in accounting rules that put scheme deficits on the 
corporate balance sheet, which meant that the deficit affected corporate actions, 
such as raising finance and engaging in M&A activity. Smaller schemes were 
among the first to close to new members and future accrual – often in a single 
step. Large employers with a high public profile hesitated to take the single-step 
route due to concerns over negative publicity and also because of potential 
trade union problems, which became a major issue. When large companies did 
announce closure (Iceland and Ernst & Young were among the first), this was 
delivered in two stages: initially to new members and then, usually about five 
years later, to all future accrual.   
So, a typical smaller scheme might have opened in 1980 and closed in 2000, 
which means that memberships might have lasted for up to 20 years. By 2012, 
this scheme would have been closed for 12 years, so the membership is likely 
to be mature, with the pensioner section representing about 40-50% of the 
total. This example merely serves to illustrate the diversity of scheme profiles. 
Practitioners examining the target market will have more detailed analysis at 
their disposal, based on client-specific data.
16 Although there are schemes with fewer than five members, the Purple Book states ‘results 
indicating five or less schemes have been supressed to preserve confidentiality’.
A healthier way to de-risk 8
Using tPR’s average ratio, we base our estimate of market size on tPR’s first two 
categories: 5-99 and 100-999. Tables 1 and 2 below are based on data in the 
Purple Book 2012. It is important to note that the percentage of pensions in 
relation to total membership (pensioners, actives and deferreds) is about 35%, 
but tPR states that they represent 39% of liabilities in aggregate. Consultants to 
whom we spoke argued that pensioners would have a similar sized claim on 
scheme assets. Moreover, deferred members’ liabilities are likely to be lower 
due to the fact that their pension rights are not payable until a future date, so 
the present value of deferred liabilities tends to be less than pensioner liabilities. 
It is also worth noting that the s179 measure of liabilities allows for the fact that 
deferred pensioners are ‘expensive’ relative to the technical provisions measure 
of liability, so this will work in the opposite direction to the impact above, 
reducing the proportion of the liabilities represented by pensioners.
table 1: dB scheme total members vs pensioner sections
Members No. schemes  Pensioners total members % Pensioners
5-99  2,260 34,275 99,289 34%
100-999 2,829 319,582 993,861 32%
Sub-total 5,089 353,857 1,099,300 32%
All schemes 6,198 4,359,458 11,732,760 37%
source: Purple Book 2012, Appendix 3  
In Table 2 we assume, for the sake of simplicity, that pensioners also represent 
39% of assets under management (AUM).  
table 2: dB scheme total assets under management vs pensioner section
Members total members(£bn) Pensioners (£bn)*  
5-99 11.6 4.5
100-999 89.6 35
Sub-total 101.2 39.5
All schemes 10,268 379.9
*Based on the assumption that the pensioner section represents 39% of s179 liabilities and AUM. 
Note: the s179 liabilities will be higher than the AUM for schemes in deficit. 
source: Purple Book 2012, Appendix 4
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To summarise this analysis, the initial target market for enhanced bulk buy-ins in 
2013-15 is likely to comprise:
•	 5,089 schemes 
•	 353,857 pensioners  
•	 £39.5bn AUM for these pensioners 
1.6 PIE exercises: Simplifying DB benefits for annuity pricing
Most annuities sold in the DC market are comparatively simple products 
compared with DB benefits. For example, indexation (a feature rarely selected 
by individual annuitants, due to the cost) is either a fixed rate or linked to the 
retail price index (RPI). By contrast, DB benefits can be very complicated to 
match with precision. Rules on widow/widower’s benefits, on pension splitting on 
divorce, and on guaranteed minimum pension (GMP) and non-GMP rights can 
be convoluted. But probably the most difficult matching exercise is in relation 
to indexation, which is complex due to changing legislation and to scheme-
specific funding arrangements, which may have changed over time (and here 
we should bear in mind that different sets of rules will apply to different sets of 
pensioners, depending on when they joined). A significant number of schemes 
have elected to put in place greater levels of indexation increase than is required 
by legislation, and these are often more complex and therefore costly or difficult 
to insure (such as Limited Price Indexation (LPI) with a minimum increase of 3% 
and a maximum increase of 5%, or fixed 5% increases), since they cannot be 
efficiently hedged 
This problem has given rise to the Pension Income Exchange (PIE) exercises 
that, starting in 2009, are being used as a pre-buy-in exercise. A PIE is where 
pensioner members agree to exchange their non-statutory pension increases 
for a higher immediate income that is not inflation-linked. In a PIE exercise, 
non-statutory pension increases, such as LPI, where the increase can vary 
between a minimum 3% and a maximum of 5%, the variable indexation rights 
are eliminated. Where PIEs are transacted ahead of a more extensive de-risking 
exercise, they can lower the cost of a bulk buy-in and the eventual bulk buy-out.  
Under such transactions, the member must receive impartial advice. 
It is important to note that PIE exercises do not affect the member’s rights 
apart from in relation to the shape of future indexation. For this reason, PIEs 
are regarded as quite separate from total pension increase exchange (TPIE) 
exercises.17 TPIE exercises (also known as Flexibility at Retirement (FaR) and 
Flexible Retirement Option (FRO)) give non-pensioner members (those over 
age 55 but below scheme pension age) the option to take an early retirement 
pension, usually involving a transfer from the scheme of the value of their 
pension to secure an immediate annuity in the shape and form that the member 
desires. PIE exercises should also be distinguished from enhanced transfer 
values (ETVs), where the member is offered a financial incentive to transfer out 
of the scheme. ETVs have become very common, particularly since 2008, but 
17  See, for example, http://www.kpmg.com/UK/en/services/Tax/Pensions/Documents/managing-
pension-liabilities-market-update.pdf, http://www.buckconsultants.com/Portals/0/uk/publications/
white-papers/IT-Pension-Increase-Exchange-uk.pdf 
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the government and regulators’ concern about the potential mis-use of this 
transaction led to the formation of a government-led working group which in 
June 2012 published a voluntary code of practice for all incentive exercises.18
Finally, it is worth noting that any exercises that involve a transfer out of the 
scheme on the part of members in poor health can affect conventional insurers’ 
willingness to quote for bulk buy-ins and buy-outs, for anti-selection reasons. 
However, we understand that where an insurer medically underwrites all 
pensioners in a cohort this is not an issue, since the quotation would reflect 
member-specific health conditions and would therefore identify a cohort that 
had above-average good health and quote accordingly. If the market develops 
so that all insurers use medical underwriting – as this report suggests is likely – 
then there should be no concerns about anti-selection.
1.7 How the enhanced bulk buy-in works
A common misunderstanding about enhanced bulk buy-ins is that insurers 
‘cherry-pick’, removing the unhealthy lives and leaving behind pensioners with 
above-average longevity. Were this to be the case, such an exercise would 
render it virtually impossible for the trustees to secure any further bulk buy-
in or bulk buy-out quotations on reasonable terms for the remaining healthy 
pensioners.
In practice, under an enhanced bulk buy-in, the insurer provides an annuity 
covering the full designated tranche of pensioners (both healthy and impaired 
lives). Depending on the insurance company’s model, an attempt will be made 
to medically underwrite either all of the lives or only some. Under the second 
model the insurer usually medically underwrites the members with the largest 
pensions. (In very small schemes, for example, we understand that a retired 
chief executive might account for up to 50% of the liabilities.) The process for 
the second model, therefore, is to examine the liability profile of the pensioner 
section, to medically underwrite the high-liability cases, and to write annuities 
for the remaining members on a standard or average mortality basis. The cases 
selected for medical underwriting would be processed first because these would 
take longer than the standard underwriting for the remaining pensioners. In 
these transactions, the insurer would submit a single price after completion of 
underwriting covering both the medically underwritten and non-underwritten 
members.
The actual scheme saving, relative to a conventional bulk buy-in, will depend on 
the extent of the medical data members are willing to disclose and the resulting 
ratio of healthy to unhealthy lives across the entire membership or the high-
liability cohort. We understand that in some cases there might be no saving at 
all from the enhanced route because members as a whole – or the high-liability 
members where these are the only pensioners medically underwritten – might be 
in average or above-average good health. 
18 http://www.incentiveexercises.org.uk   
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In summary, the process involved in an enhanced bulk buy-in is similar to 
the conventional transaction, but with the added complexity of securing and 
evaluating the medical data.
the evaluation and quotation process
An enhanced underwriting process, where high-liability lives are selected for 
medical underwriting, can be described as follows. 
1.  The trustees provide the consultant with the available member data: age, 
sex, postcode, level of pension, etc. The initial evaluation identifies the cohort 
of members that represent the bulk of liabilities. 
2.  Note that if a PIE or TPIE is undertaken, this will take at least three months 
from start to finish and the buy-in could not take place until these exercises 
are completed. 
3.  Initial consideration is given to the expected impact of de-risking on the 
residual scheme liabilities and on future de-risking exercises. In practice, 
the consultant can only give an estimate of the potential range of impacts 
of impairments on this population (i.e., if all lives are healthy, if there is a 
moderate incidence of impairment, and if there are high levels of incidence 
and severity of impairment). Generally, the model that is developing 
provides high-level information to the insurer which produces illustrations of 
how the impact of underwriting might affect the overall buy-in premium.
4.  It is also worth noting that at present two of the insurers in the enhanced 
market issue ‘short form’ initial underwriting requests (one or two sides of A4 
paper with simple tick-box questions and a request to the member to provide 
contact details for their doctor). Short form underwriting helps the insurers 
determine which of the members who returned the forms require further 
underwriting via information from the doctor or a detailed conversation 
directly with the member.
5.  The trustees grant permission to enable the insurance company/companies 
to contact the members and/or request a general practitioner’s report. 
6. The consultant approaches the market for indicative quotes.
7.  The medical underwriting takes place directly between the insurer and the 
members, so that the information remains confidential.
8.  The insurance companies invited to the auction provide guaranteed quotes.
9.  The trustees conduct a due diligence exercise (with the help of a separate 
insurance company analyst) to assess the financial strength, business model, 
and commitment to the market, among other features, of the insurer that 
has offered the best (and possibly second best) quotation. This will take into 
account any reinsurance arrangements – an important issue since, in effect, 
this is where the ‘liability buck’ stops.
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10.  A post-deal review considers the actual impact of the bulk buy-in on the 
residual scheme liabilities; the need, if any, for changes in investment 
strategy; and the revised process towards a full bulk buy-out.19 
obtaining medical information
The success of the enhanced buy-in relies on the cooperation of the scheme 
members in order to secure the medical information. It is important to 
appreciate that there is no immediate personal benefit to the scheme member 
if it is discovered that they have a life-shortening condition. In the individual 
annuity market associated with DC schemes, medical underwriting delivers a 
direct benefit to the annuitant in the form of a bigger income.  By contrast, in an 
enhanced bulk buy-in, any differential between the standard and enhanced rate 
benefits the scheme through a price reduction within the overall bulk annuity 
premium; the member’s income from the scheme remains exactly the same. 
Arguably, there is an indirect benefit to members in terms of increased security 
across the whole pension scheme, both in terms of a reduction in funding risk 
due to holding a perfectly matched asset, and also in terms of those schemes 
that benefit from a substantial price improvement through the underwriting 
process, which might expect to improve the funding level of the scheme post-
transaction.
Medical underwriting requires access to details about individual members’ state 
of health, so the trustees need to give permission for the insurer to contact the 
members. Typically the process is for the trustees to send a letter to the members 
explaining their plans and objectives (i.e., to enter a buy-in and by doing this 
to increase the security of the pension scheme) and to explain that if members 
complete the form/respond to the phone questionnaire, and provide their GPs’ 
details, where applicable, this will assist in the process. The form is not returned 
to the trustees, but to the insurer(s). 
As will be evident from the descriptions below, the three procedures currently 
used for obtaining member information are quite different, although we 
understand that some insurers offer flexibility, so that consultants and trustees 
can select the method most likely to succeed in relation to the membership 
profile. A flexible approach is more likely to facilitate competitive bidding, 
otherwise  consultants and trustees might feel obliged to select just one 
enhanced provider at a relatively early stage. This is because members cannot 
be expected to provide health and lifestyle information to more than one insurer 
via potentially different means.
the general practitioner’s report
This method is used where the insurer focuses on the high-liability pensioners, 
but it is also used in conjunction with the short questionnaire (see below), where 
the insurer needs further evidence, for example, where more complex and/or 
serious medical conditions are identified through the initial screening questions. 
Where a GP report is required, the trustees ask the selected members to sign a 
consent form.  
19 See Aon 2012 guide p 8. Note the availability of a ‘sweep-up’ mechanism to ensure deferred/
active members are included as they reach retirement.
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the phone interview 
At present, we understand that this method is used only where the high-liability 
pensioners will be medically underwritten. Once the trustees have secured the 
members’ permission, the insurance company’s medically-trained interviewers 
contact members to arrange the phone interview. Proponents of the telephone 
interview argue that this is a much more effective way to obtain detailed and 
specific medical information in an environment that is comfortable for the 
member. 
the short questionnaire 
This method tends to be used where all the pensioners will be medically 
underwritten, but, as mentioned above, the insurer might follow up with a GP 
report in a minority of cases.  
Under this model, once the member’s permission is secured by the trustees, 
the members are sent a short questionnaire which generally requires yes/
no answers. These answers are converted via algorithms to a rating system.  
Proponents of this method argue that it is a quick and effective way to get a high 
level of response. To complete the underwriting process, the insurance company 
might also ask certain members for permission to contact their GP. This might 
be in relation to the high-liability cohort and to questionnaire responses that 
indicate the member has a more complex medical condition.  
A short questionnaire might ask the following questions:
1. What is your height?
2. What is your weight?
3. Have you smoked 10 or more manufactured cigarettes per day for the past 
10 years?
4. Have you smoked 3oz/85g or more of rolling tobacco per week for the past 
10 years?
5. Have you been diagnosed with high blood pressure, requiring ongoing 
medication?
6. Have you had a heart attack requiring hospital admission?
7. Have you been diagnosed with diabetes requiring insulin or tablet 
treatment?
8. Have you suffered a stroke (CVA), excluding mini-strokes (TIAs)?
9. Have you been diagnosed with angina requiring ongoing medication?
10. Have you been diagnosed with cancer (excluding skin cancer and benign 
tumours) requiring surgery, chemotherapy or radiotherapy?
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section 2: the interviews 
Closed schemes are on a journey to a full buy-out. The buy-in can certainly help 
them get there and the enhanced buy-in might help them get there more quickly. 
But trustees need to be very careful. The expertise within the market in terms of 
consultancy skills and underwriting expertise is still evolving. independent trustee
In this section, we explore the issues raised by consultants, insurance companies, 
reinsurance companies, and independent trustees. We focus in particular on the 
enhanced bulk buy-in, but we also address issues that concern the de-risking 
market as a whole.
2.1 The impact of medical underwriting techniques on the market
There was near-unanimous agreement on the positive impact medical 
underwriting would bring to the de-risking market:
The market needs to move from using average mortality assumptions to more refined 
processes. The use of enhanced underwriting techniques marks a watershed for the de-
risking market. Consultant
In the DC market, the entry of enhanced providers really shook things up 
competition-wise and this was very welcome. The existing market had become 
complacent – there was an urgent need for new underwriting techniques and for 
greater competition. This is what I expect to happen in the DB buy-in market – in 
fact it’s already having a positive effect. insurance company
There were some initial reservations about the small number of enhanced 
players, so the entry of new providers and the adoption of medical underwriting 
by existing insurers were welcomed:
The last thing we want is a ‘unique’ proposition offered by just one insurance 
company. We need to know there is a competitive market, so we can judge pricing 
effectively. Consultant
With just one or two enhanced players, competition is weak and it’s not an efficient 
market. With four or five, I’ll be much happier. Consultant
Interviewees stressed that they wanted to see a market that included established 
players as well as newcomers: 
This is a market authentication issue. If well-known major buy-in players develop 
medical underwriting techniques, then it makes the market more balanced and less 
‘new’. Consultant
Importantly, insurers urged consultants to treat the introduction of medical 
underwriting as an extension of existing rating opportunities, not as a separate 
type of bulk buy-in:
It should not be a case of having to choose medical underwriting versus non-medical 
A healthier way to de-risk 5
underwriting. Techniques used in standard buy-in underwriting already take account 
of geographical and social factors; full medical underwriting extends this process 
through the introduction of new and more precise rating factors. For this reason, we 
would expect consultants to include a range of enhanced and traditional insurers in 
the tender process. insurance company
Indeed, the overwhelming view was that once medical underwriting was 
established it would become an essential feature that insurers would have to 
offer if they wanted to remain competitive:
The de-risking market is very young and will develop rapidly over the next few years. 
There is no doubt that once the conventional insurers see what the enhanced insurers 
are doing they will have to compete. independent trustee
Insurers that don’t offer medical underwriting have two choices: they can introduce 
this technique directly or they can do a deal with one of the specialists, so they can 
offer this service to trustees. Consultant
2.2 Anti-selection and trustee disclosure
Despite the generally positive response to enhanced bulk buy-ins, interviewees 
raised concerns about potential anti-selection issues. The first concern related to 
schemes:
The residual liabilities are the most important issue. Trustees must consider the 
unintended consequences of an enhanced buy-in. independent trustee
If an enhanced deal doesn’t go through because the pensioners are generally in above- 
average good health, this could result in future anti-selection problems. Insurers will 
ask about previous exercises and will be concerned if an enhanced buy-in exercise has 
failed. They will assume this is because the medical profile of the members – or at 
least the key members with the highest level of pensions – is healthier than average 
and they will quote a higher price accordingly. Consultant
As noted in the previous section, however, anti-selection concerns should 
disappear if all insurers offer medical underwriting, as this process would 
provide an accurate member-specific health profile. Moreover, one interviewee 
said that any increase in the trustees’ understanding of scheme-specific mortality 
was to be welcomed:
If the outcome of the enhanced deal process resulted in evidence that mortality was 
expected to be light, due to pensioner members’ above-average good health, then the 
trustees and their advisors arguably should reconsider their mortality assumptions for 
funding. The possible outcome here is that the trustees’ view of pensioner liabilities 
will increase and become, to a degree, better aligned to where the insurance market has 
now priced this risk. Consultant
Another argument offered was that information about high-liability members’ 
poor health might cause trustees to consider their longer-term goal, which is the 
full bulk buy-out:
Trustees need to consider if de-risking the pensioner section on an enhanced buy-in 
basis might affect the prospects of a full buy-out in future. If they discover that the key 
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members of the pensioner section are in poor health, they might be better positioned 
for a full buy-out if they retain these members in the scheme. In due course, full buy-
outs might operate on a medical underwriting basis. It’s a question of evaluating really 
carefully the immediate, medium-term, and long-term de-risking prospects. Consultant
The second anti-selection concern related to the conventional insurance 
company’s response to being invited to take part in a tender process that 
included enhanced providers:
We expect insurers to ask if an enhanced provider is in on the bidding process. 
Conventional providers are worried about anti-selection because the enhanced provider 
has access to additional medical data. Consultant
The simple truth is that conventional underwriters are spooked by the presence of an 
enhanced provider in the auction. If a conventional provider wins over an enhanced 
provider, it will be very worried as the implication is that the key members are in 
above-average health. Consultant 
Disclosure of ‘material information’ by trustees proved to be a major concern for 
insurance companies and there seemed to be some confusion over the trustees’ 
responsibility on this point:
As an insurer, we expect potential buyers to disclose all material facts. The onus in 
a buy-in falls on trustees to disclose all information about the current and previous 
de-risking exercises. If trustees don’t get this point, then they are in danger, because 
insurance companies will seek redress if it emerges that a previous transaction or the 
current bidding process might involve specialist underwriting techniques. We don’t 
want to have to rely on asking the right questions – trustees should automatically 
disclose all relevant information. At present, this whole issue of disclosure is very 
subjective and that’s worrying. insurance company
In practice, at present the schemes that consultants and trustees are most 
likely to consider for medical underwriting are those where they expect to see 
heavier expected mortality than might be normally predicted by insurers writing 
conventional business. Historically, these schemes will have given rise to material 
‘experience profits’ for insurers, as they would have been priced at a level 
reflecting ‘average’ mortality and as experience from year to year turns out to 
be heavier, the insurer would recognize additional profits over and above those 
that they had ‘booked’ when they wrote the business. In this respect, medical 
underwriting creates a more level playing field for trustees and insurers.
Beyond the concerns of the insurance companies, reinsurers also said they were 
also keeping a close eye on enhanced underwriting and the potential impact on 
the risks that they undertake:
Where we provide reinsurance for longevity risk in relation to a cohort of pensioners’ 
lives, we need to know what previous de-risking exercises have taken place and 
whether these have incorporated medical underwriting. This includes TPIE exercises, 
as the trustees might have removed high-value pensioners in poor health from the 
scheme, which will affect the characteristics of the risk we are reinsuring. Disclosure of 
all previous de-risking exercises is crucial to a well-functioning market.  
reinsurance company
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2.3 Obtaining medical data
All interviewees agreed that accurate member medical data are the prerequisite 
to an accurate enhanced bulk buy-in quotation. To obtain the data, the 
consultant and insurance company rely on the trustees to secure the members’ 
permission, so that the insurance company can approach the member for 
information. We were told that the preliminary analysis is crucial:
The preliminary analysis of the membership and the identification of the members 
who represent the bulk of the liabilities are crucial. If the medical profile of these 
members is misjudged, the enhanced deal might fail. insurance company 
We were also told that consultants and insurers rely on trustees’ discretion in 
providing personal details of retired scheme members:
It is often the case with smaller schemes that the trustees know the retired executives 
who account for most of the liabilities. Therefore they might be willing to provide a 
generic insight without breaking confidences. Consultant
In a smaller scheme, there might be useful data that in a larger scheme would 
be statistically insignificant. For example, if several directors and executives have 
taken early ill-health retirement, this could be a very positive indicator that medical 
underwriting is worth considering. insurance company
The greatest challenge cited was the task of getting members to complete 
medical questionnaires or respond to a phone interview within the usual turn-
around time, which we understand is eight to 10 weeks:
In the individual market, the annuitant is incentivized to provide as many details 
as possible because he or she benefits directly from the enhanced rate. In an enhanced 
buy-in, it’s the scheme that benefits – there’s nothing in it for the members, so 
motivating them to provide very personal details about their state of health and about 
their smoking habits, for example, is never going to be easy. Consultant
Members can get very worried if they are contacted about a de-risking exercise.  
They think it’s being considered because there’s a problem with the scheme.  
insurance company
However, from what limited information is available at present, it seems that 
members are willing to disclose the medical details, provided they understand 
the purpose of the exercise:
It’s important to remember that several enhanced insurers focus on the retired 
executives and directors. We find that retired senior managers quickly grasp the 
purpose of the de-risking exercise and appreciate that this is designed to further 
strengthen their scheme and, therefore, their frequently substantial pension rights. 
insurance company
There is an upside for the member for completing the questionnaire. If a deal goes 
ahead because of a greater incidence of impairments, then the member’s benefits should 
be more secure. Also, if impairments are very material, then the funding position of 
the scheme may improve, resulting in a reduced reliance on the sponsor’s covenant. 
Consultant
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It’s a good idea to get on board one or two members with the largest pensions 
first. If we can find the right way to secure their cooperation, this sets the tone for 
communications to other members. insurance company 
There was marked disagreement over the best way to obtain information from 
members:
A simple questionnaire is the best way and can achieve a response rate of up to  
90%. However, this does need to be supplemented with GP reports in the case  
of the minority of members whose questionnaire response indicates a more serious 
underlying medical condition, especially where these are high-liability members. 
insurance company
Simplified questionnaires are too shallow and can only result in imperfect 
underwriting. Using trained medical experts to conduct phone interviews achieves a 
much more comprehensive medical profile for all the key members. insurance company
While it is inevitable that insurers will disagree over their chosen methodology, 
interviewees stressed that it shouldn’t be a case of either/or, but that insurers 
need to make different methods available, so that trustees and their consultants 
can select the approach to members most likely to succeed, given their 
knowledge of the membership:
We need to consider all methods for getting medical data – questionnaires, phone 
interviews by medically trained staff, and also GPs’ reports. They are all relevant. 
Consultant
Resolving this issue was seen as the key to the growth of an efficient market: 
Sorting out the way to establish a whole-of-market enhanced quotation process is 
the main challenge. We have very few players in the buy-in market, even fewer with 
enhanced underwriting expertise, but the latter group already uses at least three 
different approaches to obtaining the data. As trustees, we can’t ask members to agree 
to be approached by three different insurers, so at present we have to pre-select an 
enhanced underwriter and this means that we might not get a whole-of-market quote. 
independent trustee 
Insurers need to be flexible and offer the data collection approach preferred by the 
consultant and trustees – not the method that suits the insurer best. If insurers 
move to this model, consultants and trustees can be confident that they will secure a 
competitive quotation. insurance company 
Data sharing between insurers and with stakeholders in the market was seen as 
important for the development of best practice and flexibility:
The best medical underwriting methodologies will emerge only with time; we need 
to see a track record of data obtained and to measure this against the quotations. 
Consultant
Several consultants in the small scheme market have introduced a ‘quick-quote’ 
system to help with the preliminary assessment, but opinions varied on the 
merits of this approach:
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The idea is that we can get a good assessment of the potential for an enhanced buy-in 
if we test the scheme with an insurer that has a rapid turn-around time. We can do 
this in two weeks and at a low cost. If the result is positive, we can take the scheme to 
market with greater confidence of a successful outcome. Consultant
Do we use one provider that offers a streamlined process? This is the model some 
consultants now offer, but it is worrying. How do we know whether the provider that 
offers a quick-quote service is the best? Consultant
Irrespective of the consultant’s approach to the bidding process, interviewees 
agreed that the trustees need to be ‘ready to go’ to take advantage of market 
opportunities:
What you need is to agree beforehand a series of trigger points, so that you can react 
quickly to market timing. For this to be successful, you have to be absolutely prepared 
with everything lined up and ready to go. Consultant
Trigger points, for example with reference to funding and to gilt and inflation 
movements, should be discussed well in advance of the buy-in exercise, as the tensions 
of the process can lead to irrational behaviour and poor decision-making. Consultant
Opportunities arise that have nothing to do with technical issues. It might be the 
case that providers discount pricing because they need to meet new business quotas.20 
Consultant  
2.4 Optimal size of schemes
In terms of market potential, several interviewees stressed the need for better 
data and for independent modelling to rationalize the current debate:
We need better modelling to demonstrate the rationale for smaller schemes and to 
identify the cut-off point where medical underwriting becomes statistically unreliable 
or simply impractical from a logistical perspective. Consultant
It was felt, by some, that there were no rational barriers to medically 
underwriting larger schemes: 
At present, it is assumed that only smaller schemes can benefit from enhanced buy-
ins. We challenge that view. In theory, medical underwriting could be extended to any 
scheme where there is a cohort of members that account for a disproportionate level 
of liabilities. We accept this is a more complicated exercise and requires access to the 
medical information provided by a larger number of retired executives and directors, 
but we think this should be possible. Consultant
One interviewee suggested that the proposed target market of smaller schemes 
was due to the insurers’ business model and the imperatives of the balance 
sheet, rather than logic:
20 This point was also raised in Towers Watson’s Derisking Report 2012: http://www.towerswatson.
com/united-kingdom/research/6871  
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Is the focus on smaller schemes due to the genuine informational disadvantage or due 
to the insurers’ ability to only medically underwrite a certain number of members? 
independent trustee
What the new entrants are proposing in terms of focusing only on the smaller schemes 
is driven by their capacity – they simply can’t take on £1bn+ liabilities. So we 
need to consider how the market might develop in practice, where large insurers adopt 
medical underwriting and have the capacity to deal with the big schemes. Consultant
One option for larger scheme is to divide the pensioner section in a way that 
would facilitate a series of bulk buy-ins:
This is a very complex issue, but also a very exciting prospect. We might, for example, 
simply divide the pensioner section according to age, but we might also consider a 
division based on the level of pension. Whichever way you cut it, you need to think 
very carefully about the impact of one or more buy-ins on the residual membership 
profile and the liabilities. Consultant
Other interviewees raised concerns over multiple transactions:
We need to think very carefully about the total advisory costs associated with all these 
transactions. These may negate any upside through ‘tranching-up’ the membership, 
especially as each exercise is likely to be run on a whole-of-market basis. We also need 
to think about what happens if the scheme transacts bulk buy-ins for five tranches of 
pensioners, each with a different insurer. How complex now is the full wind-up and 
buy-out of the scheme? Consultant
Employers might press for multiple transactions relating to individuals and sections of 
pensioners. This can be dangerous, partly because there is a greater chance of something 
going wrong – as in ‘too many moving parts’ – but also because the residual impact 
on the scheme might be difficult to predict in terms of future de-risking exercises. It’s 
essential that employers and trustees keep a focus on the ultimate goal, which is a full 
buy-out. Consultant
2.5 Due diligence in insurer selection
There were very mixed views on the way in which an enhanced provider should 
be selected. Several consultants said that brand is an important consideration 
for trustees:
Trustees need to recognise the name of the insurer. It’s hard trying to convince them 
that a new player is a better alternative, even if it can offer and support a better price. 
Consultant
However, one insurer said that brand was irrelevant, but that financial strength 
was crucial:
This isn’t the retail market, where an individual customer might go for a brand name 
he or she recognises, usually based on spurious reasons, such as the fact that the insurer 
has been reliable as a car insurance provider. In the DB de-risking market, it’s about 
financial strength. If you are rated by S&P, Moody’s or Fitch, then there is a clear due 
diligence process as far as the trustees are concerned. If the insurer is not rated, what 
will be the trustees’ legal position if things go pear-shaped? insurance company
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A consultant countered this view:
Big isn’t necessarily best. We always use a specialist to evaluate the potential provider 
and a lot depends on their reinsurance arrangements, their commitment to the market 
and on their additional capital. Consultant
The above views suggest that ‘brand’ is understood in different ways.  Insurance 
company analysts were more specific on the factors to consider, although again, 
their views varied: 
When we evaluate an insurance company, we are not interested in the price of the 
deal; nor do we focus that much on financial strength ratings, which can be pretty 
meaningless if considered in isolation. Brand is totally immaterial – think about the 
number of ‘big’ household name insurers that were around in the 1980s and 1990s 
that have since disappeared. Our job is to consider what could go wrong. We need to 
ask who is providing the capital and are they committed to the bulk annuity market? 
What happens if the insurance company withdraws from the market or is taken over? 
How does the company reinsure its longevity risk and how committed to the market 
is that reinsurance company? How do they manage their capital and balance their 
risks in the UK and globally? insurance company analyst  
 
We consider brand important from a corporate finance perspective, as this concept 
incorporates an implicit assumption of a strong covenant and also longevity in the 
market, which we take into consideration carefully, given the long-term nature of 
de-risking strategies. Faced with two quotes that are not so far apart, I’d rather go 
with the company that’s very well-diversified and has been in the business for decades, 
rather than a relative newcomer. So, we consider the pricing relative to the insurer’s 
covenant. It’s rarely advantageous for trustees to go with a weaker covenant just 
because the price is lowest. Where the employer covenant is comparatively weak, this 
issue is critical. insurance company analyst
The relevance of the insurer’s covenant to the scheme’s stability emerged as an 
important consideration:
It’s often said that introducing an insurer’s covenant, in addition to the employer’s, is 
automatically better. This is simply not true where the scheme sponsor’s business is 
thriving and is large and well-diversified, although we have encountered cases in large 
schemes where the insurer’s covenant offers a hedge against economic conditions to 
which the employer might be vulnerable. However, the addition of a strong insurer’s 
covenant in the case of smaller companies, where the employer covenant is relatively 
weak, is a no-brainer. Moreover it does not make good business sense for some smaller 
companies to run a DB scheme, due to diseconomies of scale.  
insurance company analyst
Commitment to the market was identified by one interviewee as the most 
problematic issue:
With constant changes in the market players, we might know the identity of the 
counter party at the time of the buy-in and be satisfied about its financial strength 
and commitment to the market – only to discover that a few weeks’ later this insurer 
has withdrawn from the market or has been taken over by an insurer we do not know. 
independent trustee
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We have been very cautious in dealing with new market entrants, especially if they 
are single-line insurers with private owners that do not demonstrate a business 
model committed to the market, for example. To us, this indicates a potential lack of 
longevity, as the owners might not see the risk of business failure as a threat to the 
group. It also represents a potentially weak covenant. insurance company analyst
The role of reinsurers in relation to the insurer’s covenant was also mentioned:
The fact that the insurer reinsures its longevity risk is not enough to satisfy me. You 
need to see through the contract between the insurer and trustees to see how this 
would work in practice in ‘what if’ situations, for example if the insurer goes bust. In 
this case, the scheme will just be one of many creditors and there might be insufficient 
reinsurance to cover everything. Also, in many cases the reinsurance is arranged 
post-deal – especially with smaller transactions, which get packaged together at a 
later date. Overall I would say that getting sufficient information about reinsurance 
arrangements is very difficult and the reinsurers themselves don’t tend to be very 
forthcoming. insurance company analyst
2.6 Expertise among trustees, employers and their advisers 
One of the concerns interviewees raised about the burgeoning buy-in market 
was that trustees and employers might become distracted by short-term 
expedients and might fail to consider long-term strategy:
Trustees and employers must focus on the strategic direction for the scheme. This macro 
approach is often lacking and in its place is a micro focus that is based on a product 
mentality. insurance company
The alignment of the trustee and corporate sponsor objectives might also prove 
problematic:
I advise a large multi-billion pound scheme. The new employer, driven by the views 
of the corporate treasurer, is anti-buy-in. The corporate treasurer looks at the cost 
of borrowing money to support the scheme covenant versus the cost of de-risking 
premiums and is not persuaded to favour a buy-in. The trustees have a dilemma. 
If they go for the buy-in, they might stabilize the scheme, but at the risk that the 
employer might withhold future funding because it disagrees. independent trustee
Moreover, one interviewee pointed out that in very small schemes, the trustee 
and corporate sponsor’s objectives can appear to be well aligned, but not 
necessarily for the right reasons:
We find that where deals are in the £50m-plus range, the quality of scheme 
governance tends to be much better than it is for small schemes looking to transact, 
say, a £10m deal. Once you get to very small schemes, there is often a governance 
overlap between the employer and the trustees, because the finance director sits on 
the trustee board. These are not insuperable issues, but you need to be aware of them 
and be confident that the trustees and employers are both well advised and that due 
diligence is being carried out for both parties. insurance company
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Separately, tPR has expressed serious concerns about the levels of knowledge, 
training and governance in smaller schemes and also about the quality of 
data.21 Interviewees said that tPR had a crucial role to play in educating trustees 
about enhanced bulk buy-ins and that this applied to small and large scheme 
alike: 
You might think that trustees of large DB schemes that are also responsible for small 
legacy schemes might have higher levels of knowledge about de-risking and that the 
same would be true of the employers. In practice, this is not necessarily the case. The 
trustees of the main scheme tend to neglect legacy schemes, due to lack of time, so their 
potentially higher level of awareness and knowledge does not necessarily translate into 
action. independent trustee 
It’s not just trustees and employers who need to be educated about the potential 
benefits of enhanced bulk buy-ins – we were told that front-line consultants in 
the larger firms also need to improve their knowledge:
In some cases, the incumbent investment consultant and actuary might not be up 
to speed with developments because they are remote from the firm’s buy-in research 
engine. Consultant
We need to educate the consultants that operate on the front line in this market. 
Expertise tends to be concentrated among the members of the firm’s buy-out team, but 
these specialists are not the first point of contact with trustees. There is a pressing need 
to ensure that scheme investment consultants and the actuaries are made aware of 
enhanced buy-in opportunities and risks. insurance company
There were also very real concerns about the level of knowledge among smaller 
firms of advisers:
Initially, at least, we expect enhanced BPAs to take place in the smaller company 
market and, in these cases, the employers and trustees often rely on a local or regional 
firm of consultants or IFAs. As an industry we need to make sure these firms are 
supported. This isn’t a matter of good will – if anything goes wrong in small deals 
due to lack of expertise, it will affect all of us. insurance company
Finally, interviewees disagreed over which party should drive the agenda and, 
therefore, which adviser should take precedence in negotiations:
Trustees are usually advised by a benefits and investment consultant. It’s possible that 
consultants have a vested interest in preferring buy-ins and in avoiding buy-outs, as 
the buy-out reduces the size of the scheme and therefore would reduce the consultant’s 
remuneration. independent trustee
What the employer needs is to de-risk as soon as possible through a full buy-out, 
even if it means borrowing to do so. Actuarial and investment consultants have strong 
vested interests in keeping the scheme going. They are hugely conflicted – if they 
organise a full buy-out, then they’ve lost their ongoing advisory fee income.  
insurance company
21 www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/docs/role-of-trustees-in-dc-schemes-statement-oct-2011.pdf  
A healthier way to de-risk 34
Employers should take a hard look at the type of advisers in the market. Where the 
consultant earns an on-going fee for advising the trustees, it is conflicted in the de-
risking market because it has a vested interest in keeping that scheme going. Transfer 
the entire risk to an insurance company and you cut off the source of fee income 
stream. insurance company 
But investment consultants said that their profession should be well-aware by 
now of the ‘writing on the wall’:
In reality most schemes are now building strategies towards fully de-risking or 
removing the scheme from the employer’s balance sheet, so the writing is on the wall 
to a degree. Consultants need to wake up to commercial realities, to the future of the 
industry, and to their clients’ needs. Consultant
It was suggested that accountancy-based consultants that advise employers 
might also be considered biased:
We see a very different perspective from the employer’s consultant – the agenda will 
definitely be from the company’s perspective and will not necessarily be in the best 
interests of the scheme. Consultant 
This view was countered, however:
The journey to full wind-up needs to be considered from an overarching corporate-
restructuring perspective. Corporate sponsors need to consider how best to deploy their 
resources and to balance the demands of pension scheme funding with the imperatives 
of maintaining the company’s reputation in the market and its share price. Consultant
De-risking the pension scheme is part of de-risking the corporate balance sheet. It’s 
the employer – usually the finance director and/or corporate treasurer – who needs 
to drive the process because these are the individuals who hold the purse strings. 
insurance company
To conclude this interview section, it seems likely that the introduction of more 
sophisticated underwriting techniques will prompt very serious discussions 
between trustees, employers and their respective advisers. This is why we 
propose that a code of good practice is developed that accommodates the 
potentially conflicted objectives of trustees and employers. The role of the 
regulators will be crucial here:
Ultimately a buy-in or buy-out is a trustee decision, so they make the final decisions. 
In reality, the process needs to be jointly owned with joint goals which may differ 
somewhat between sponsor and trustees, but each has a vital role to play in the 
process. Consultant
Corporate sponsors need to own the balance sheet problem and understand the price 
of not taking action to de-risk. Consultant
Corporates that don’t take de-risking action will go bust. It’s as simple as that. If you 
look at the deficits of the FTSE 100 companies you can see that these are way off 
the scale. The Pension Protection Fund couldn’t cope with them, so, like the banks, 
they are too big to fail. But, as we now know, they can and will fail. If they don’t de-
risk, they will end up in the PPF, whether the PPF likes it or not. Consultant
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section 3: Case studies 
In this section, we provide a case study for a medically-underwritten transaction 
that was completed recently. This is thought to be the first time such information 
has been made available. 
We then consider the savings that might be achieved in a DB scheme through an 
enhanced bulk buy-in.  These case studies, which are based on real cases that are 
not yet completed, demonstrate that the cost saving to the scheme of medically 
underwriting a pensioner section is in the region of 10% when compared with 
non-medical underwriting and can be much higher, we understand. 
3.1 The first completed medically-underwritten transactions 
The objectives of the employer and trustees were fully aligned: they wanted to get the 
best price possible for the pensioner section, as part of a strategic plan to wind-up the 
scheme in a secure and cost-effective manner. Partnership Assurance
In December 2012, Partnership Assurance completed the first two medically-
underwritten bulk annuity transactions (valued at just over £3m and just under 
£1m, respectively). Here we highlight the key features of the first case on an 
anonymised basis. We conclude with our observations on what all stakeholders 
can learn from this very early experience in the market.
transaction size: c. £3m
transaction type: A bulk buy-in. We understand that the trustees and employer’s 
strategic plan is to wind-up the scheme as quickly as possible and that 
Partnership’s pricing enabled them to achieve that objective through a buy-in 
that will move to a buyout within weeks. 
the employer: A traditional manufacturer in the North of England. The 
employer and trustees had considered a bulk buy-in about nine months earlier, 
but were unable to proceed due to the cost being prohibitive.
the medical underwriting: There were 18 pensioners, all of whom completed 
the one-page questionnaire. In a minority of cases, Partnership also requested 
a GP report. The insurer’s analysis revealed that more than one-third of the 
pensioners qualified for an enhanced premium. 
timing: The process from the initial discussion to the trustees locking into terms 
and completing the transaction took just over two months. 
scheme saving: We do not have details of the previous bid pricing, but it is 
evident that the savings achieved through medical underwriting were significant 
relative to the previous quotation, as the scheme was able to secure a viable 
price that will lead very shortly to a buy-out.  
observations: 
1.  The cost savings of medically underwriting the bulk transaction were 
sufficient to enable the scheme to proceed almost immediately with an 
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affordable buy-out, rather than with a prolonged buy-in, thus taking the 
scheme more rapidly towards its strategic goal to wind up the scheme.
2.  The success of the outcome depended to a great extent on the alignment of 
the objectives of all parties to the transaction. In this case, we understand 
that the employer and trustees were of one mind, and that they and their 
advisers worked very closely with the insurer. 
3.  The case is notable for the speed with which it progressed from quotation to 
completion.
4.  It is also notable that all the pensioners responded to the request for medical 
information, including those who were asked to permit the insurer to request 
a GP report. 
5.  The advisory market for these deals, which represent transactions worth 
c. £1-5m, comprises small regional IFAs and small regional actuarial 
consultants. Such firms would benefit from additional expertise and 
guidance from the industry, for example through our proposed code 
of conduct, and support from the regulators. The same is true for the 
employers and trustees.
3.2 Examples from DC case studies
We now turn to look at the effect of enhancements for various conditions in the 
retail (individual DC annuity) market, the market in which enhanced annuities 
started. Tables 3 and 4 show the conditions commonly seen in the retired 
population, where it is believed that around 60% of individuals have conditions 
that could qualify for enhancements.22 Table 3, which shows the case of a single 
male life with a £25,000 fund, indicates that additional income (relative to the 
average standard rate) of 11.8% is available in the case of heart disease, while 
in the case of diabetes, the additional income is 32.1%. In the case of joint lives, 
Table 4 shows slightly lower enhancements of 9.4% and 20.3%, respectively, for 
the same two impairments.
table 3: enhancements for various conditions available with a single life 
annuity for a 65-year-old male with a £25,000 fund
source: Partnership.  
22 Ulla Suomio (2012) ‘Proportion of cases that could qualify for an enhanced annuity’,  
Partnership research study, June. 
smoker diabetes heart disease stroke Combination Average standard rate
Partnership rate £1608.31 £1739.70 £1471.48 £1739.70 £1582.92
% additional income 
versus average 
standard
22.2% 32.1% 11.8% 32.1% 20.2% £1316.50
% additional income 
versus best standard
18.0% 27.7% 8.0% 27.7% 16.2% £1362.60
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Combination assumes overweight, high blood pressure and high cholesterol.
table 4: enhancements for various conditions available with a joint life 
annuity for a 65-year-old male with a £25,000 fund (assuming a healthy 
spouse 3 years younger)
source: Partnership. Combination assumes overweight, high blood pressure and high 
cholesterol.
3.3 Examples from DB case studies
Turning to DB schemes, we consider two examples of anonymised schemes for 
which Partnership provided a quotation for enhanced buy-in.  Scheme A had 
total cost savings of 10.99%, while Scheme B had total cost savings of 9.8%. 
The benchmark for comparison here and in Scheme B below is a conventional 
underwriting process that assumes members have no impairments. 
scheme A
•	 Scheme with 98 retired lives
•	 Total cost for healthy lives: £12.92 million
•	 Total cost if all lives enhanced: £11.50 million
•	 Saving if all lives enhanced:  £1.42 million (10.99%)
•	  Viewing individual prices, two lives account for 37.7% of the cost and 40.1% 
of the saving from the enhanced annuity for which they qualified (see 
highlighted rows).
table 5: Cost savings per member from medical underwriting in scheme A
smoker diabetes heart disease stroke Combination Average standard rate
Partnership rate £1313.17 £1413.66 £1285.62 £1413.66 £1341.85
% additional income
versus average
standard
11.7% 20.3% 9.4% 20.3% 14.2% £1175.30
% additional income
versus best standard
5.5% 13.6% 3.3% 13.6% 7.8% £1244.88
sex Premium
healthy impaired saving % of saving % saving % of cost
F 7820.00 6073.00 1747.00 0.12% 22.3% 0.06%
M 324557.00 292593.00 31964.00 2.25% 9.8% 2.51%
F 7421.00 6010.00 1411.00 0.10% 19.0% 0.06%
F 14592.00 11614.00 2978.00 0.21% 20.4% 0.11%
F 20202.00 17124.00 3078.00 0.22% 15.2% 0.16%
F 89358.00 77063.00 12295.00 0.87% 13.8% 0.69%
M 108878.00 88175.00 20703.00 1.46% 19.0% 0.84%
F 76761.00 67236.00 9525.00 0.67% 12.4% 0.59%
F 97336.00 79938.00 17398.00 1.22% 17.9% 0.75%
F 6252.00 5199.00 1053.00 0.07% 16.8% 0.05%
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healthy impaired saving % of saving % saving % of cost
F 15887.00 14261.00 1626.00 0.11% 10.2% 0.12%
F 4278.00 3171.00 1107.00 0.08% 25.9% 0.03%
F 62238.00 53713.00 8525.00 0.60% 13.7% 0.48%
F 41811.00 31250.00 10561.00 0.74% 25.3% 0.32%
M 12195.00 10071.00 2124.00 0.15% 17.4% 0.09%
F 5396.00 4018.00 1378.00 0.10% 25.5% 0.04%
F 100271.00 84029.00 16242.00 1.14% 16.2% 0.78%
F 34201.00 28822.00 5379.00 0.38% 15.7% 0.26%
F 10601.00 8035.00 2566.00 0.18% 24.2% 0.08%
F 65092.00 56020.00 9072.00 0.64% 13.9% 0.50%
M 78940.00 67977.00 10963.00 0.77% 13.9% 0.61%
M 14422.00 12565.00 1857.00 0.13% 12.9% 0.11%
M 174102.00 160573.00 13529.00 0.95% 7.8% 1.35%
M 85583.00 76358.00 9225.00 0.65% 10.8% 0.66%
F 3308.00 2503.00 805.00 0.06% 24.3% 0.03%
F 2791.00 2052.00 739.00 0.05% 26.5% 0.02%
F 445363.00 417412.00 27951.00 1.97% 6.3% 3.45%
F 8057.00 6897.00 1160.00 0.08% 14.4% 0.06%
F 12647.00 9381.00 3266.00 0.23% 25.8% 0.10%
M 313462.00 289684.00 23778.00 1.67% 7.6% 2.43%
M 22405.00 18970.00 3435.00 0.24% 15.3% 0.17%
F 12224.00 10865.00 1359.00 0.10% 11.1% 0.09%
F 49695.00 44083.00 5612.00 0.40% 11.3% 0.38%
F 164589.00 145151.00 19438.00 1.37% 11.8% 1.27%
F 86984.00 74608.00 12376.00 0.87% 14.2% 0.67%
F 10484.00 8554.00 1930.00 0.14% 18.4% 0.08%
F 9936.00 8977.00 959.00 0.07% 9.7% 0.08%
F 6712.00 5568.00 1144.00 0.08% 17.0% 0.05%
F 14519.00 11422.00 3097.00 0.22% 21.3% 0.11%
M 9764.00 7850.00 1914.00 0.13% 19.6% 0.08%
F 33372.00 28335.00 5037.00 0.35% 15.1% 0.26%
M 8108.00 6933.00 1175.00 0.08% 14.5% 0.06%
F 13363.00 11340.00 2023.00 0.14% 15.1% 0.10%
F 12274.00 10389.00 1885.00 0.13% 15.4% 0.09%
F 41509.00 29536.00 11973.00 0.84% 28.8% 0.32%
F 27774.00 24922.00 2852.00 0.20% 10.3% 0.21%
F 41384.00 34044.00 7340.00 0.52% 17.7% 0.32%
M 30982.00 25117.00 5865.00 0.41% 18.9% 0.24%
F 1839874.00 1731011.00 108863.00 7.66% 5.9% 14.24%
F 10936.00 10009.00 927.00 0.07% 8.5% 0.08%
F 177516.00 168764.00 8752.00 0.62% 4.9% 1.37%
F 1075.00 865.00 210.00 0.01% 19.5% 0.01%
M 165109.00 146128.00 18981.00 1.34% 11.5% 1.28%
F 10366.00 8752.00 1614.00 0.11% 15.6% 0.08%
F 68813.00 61641.00 7172.00 0.50% 10.4% 0.53%
F 1349.00 1082.00 267.00 0.02% 19.8% 0.01%
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healthy impaired saving % of saving % saving % of cost
F 177476.00 153245.00 24231.00 1.71% 13.7% 1.37%
M 10444.00 7914.00 2530.00 0.18% 24.2% 0.08%
F 18529.00 15113.00 3416.00 0.24% 18.4% 0.14%
F 13343.00 11426.00 1917.00 0.13% 14.4% 0.10%
M 27495.00 24714.00 2781.00 0.20% 10.1% 0.21%
F 8624.00 7737.00 887.00 0.06% 10.3% 0.07%
F 30563.00 26150.00 4413.00 0.31% 14.4% 0.24%
F 4498.00 3998.00 500.00 0.04% 11.1% 0.03%
F 9202.00 7232.00 1970.00 0.14% 21.4% 0.07%
F 56641.00 46061.00 10580.00 0.74% 18.7% 0.44%
F 28273.00 24359.00 3914.00 0.28% 13.8% 0.22%
M 101538.00 90802.00 10736.00 0.76% 10.6% 0.79%
F 7273.00 5396.00 1877.00 0.13% 25.8% 0.06%
M 37716.00 30469.00 7247.00 0.51% 19.2% 0.29%
F 5045.00 4835.00 210.00 0.01% 4.2% 0.04%
F 57509.00 47687.00 9822.00 0.69% 17.1% 0.45%
F 189215.00 165865.00 23350.00 1.64% 12.3% 1.46%
M 843772.00 805053.00 38719.00 2.73% 4.6% 6.53%
M 80108.00 67315.00 12793.00 0.90% 16.0% 0.62%
F 46003.00 37914.00 8089.00 0.57% 17.6% 0.36%
F 77231.00 66828.00 10403.00 0.73% 13.5% 0.60%
M 20732.00 17871.00 2861.00 0.20% 13.8% 0.16%
F 26631.00 22572.00 4059.00 0.29% 15.2% 0.21%
M 986575.00 915745.00 70830.00 4.99% 7.2% 7.64%
F 104233.00 93563.00 10670.00 0.75% 10.2% 0.81%
F 327907.00 319544.00 8363.00 0.59% 2.6% 2.54%
F 69165.00 55603.00 13562.00 0.95% 19.6% 0.54%
M 54536.00 47215.00 7321.00 0.52% 13.4% 0.42%
M 185730.00 157626.00 28104.00 1.98% 15.1% 1.44%
M 3027368.00 2566283.00 461085.00 32.46% 15.2% 23.43%
F 38698.00 32190.00 6508.00 0.46% 16.8% 0.30%
F 20635.00 14869.00 5766.00 0.41% 27.9% 0.16%
F 98241.00 79734.00 18507.00 1.30% 18.8% 0.76%
F 28937.00 25571.00 3366.00 0.24% 11.6% 0.22%
F 77243.00 64004.00 13239.00 0.93% 17.1% 0.60%
M 27097.00 23548.00 3549.00 0.25% 13.1% 0.21%
F 20941.00 19156.00 1785.00 0.13% 8.5% 0.16%
F 329579.00 292670.00 36909.00 2.60% 11.2% 2.55%
M 18257.00 16007.00 2250.00 0.16% 12.3% 0.14%
F 104437.00 90857.00 13580.00 0.96% 13.0% 0.81%
F 7039.00 6314.00 725.00 0.05% 10.3% 0.05%
M 401811.00 364965.00 36846.00 2.59% 9.2% 3.11%
totAl 12921228.00 11500753.00 1420475.00 100% 10.99% 100%
source: Partnership.
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scheme B
In this example, there was an unexpectedly large proportion of impaired lives 
(87 out of 107 respondents). In addition, there was a large number of spouses 
with health impairments. The pensioner profile represented a combination 
of white- and blue-collar employees with members living all over the UK and 
Ireland.
•	 Total cost for healthy lives: £33.9 million
•	 Total cost if all lives enhanced: £30.6 million
•	 Saving if all lives enhanced:  £3.3 million (9.8%)
•	  No indication without underwriting exercise that mortality should be 
anything other than ‘average’.  
•	  The benefit of medical underwriting was spread more evenly over the 
membership than in the case of Scheme A.
table 6: Cost savings per member from medical underwriting in scheme B
reference Premium healthy difference % saving % of total saving % of cost
1 256540 273722.00 17182.00 6.3% 0.52% 0.84%
2 507994 558880.00 50886.00 9.1% 1.54% 1.66%
3 321542 340448.00 18906.00 5.6% 0.57% 1.05%
4 286834 332620.00 45786.00 13.8% 1.38% 0.94%
5 55129 57297.00 2168.00 3.8% 0.07% 0.18%
6 57271 64174.00 6903.00 10.8% 0.21% 0.19%
7 501674 519718.00 18044.00 3.5% 0.55% 1.64%
8 27165 31826.00 4661.00 14.6% 0.14% 0.09%
9 454963 472142.00 17179.00 3.6% 0.52% 1.49%
10 234876 244113.00 9237.00 3.8% 0.28% 0.77%
11 192989 200578.00 7589.00 3.8% 0.23% 0.63%
12 72015 111191.00 39176.00 35.2% 1.19% 0.24%
13 59948 62306.00 2358.00 3.8% 0.07% 0.20%
14 394984 502909.00 107925.00 21.5% 3.26% 1.29%
15 354218 381859.00 27641.00 7.2% 0.84% 1.16%
16 166643 173197.00 6554.00 3.8% 0.20% 0.54%
17 72953 103009.00 30056.00 29.2% 0.91% 0.24%
18 396799 408893.00 12094.00 3.0% 0.37% 1.30%
19 73405 76292.00 2887.00 3.8% 0.09% 0.24%
20 452173 469349.00 17176.00 3.7% 0.52% 1.48%
21 52038 66421.00 14383.00 21.7% 0.44% 0.17%
22 81875 97686.00 15811.00 16.2% 0.48% 0.27%
23 96233 113145.00 16912.00 14.9% 0.51% 0.31%
24 128946 169080.00 40134.00 23.7% 1.21% 0.42%
25 230746 207686.00 -23060.00 -11.1% -0.70% 0.75%
26 160058 248394.00 88336.00 35.6% 2.67% 0.52%
27 117443 122062.00 4619.00 3.8% 0.14% 0.38%
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reference Premium healthy difference % saving % of total saving % of cost
28 22107 22976.00 869.00 3.8% 0.03% 0.07%
29 103540 116941.00 13401.00 11.5% 0.41% 0.34%
30 227132 260084.00 32952.00 12.7% 1.00% 0.74%
31 160055 178815.00 18760.00 10.5% 0.57% 0.52%
32 551672 582414.00 30742.00 5.3% 0.93% 1.80%
33 262175 323836.00 61661.00 19.0% 1.87% 0.86%
34 631349 655043.00 23694.00 3.6% 0.72% 2.06%
35 171302 178038.00 6736.00 3.8% 0.20% 0.56%
36 251994 261904.00 9910.00 3.8% 0.30% 0.82%
37 96619 100419.00 3800.00 3.8% 0.11% 0.32%
38 222984 241465.00 18481.00 7.7% 0.56% 0.73%
39 36933 53181.00 16248.00 30.6% 0.49% 0.12%
40 17382 24737.00 7355.00 29.7% 0.22% 0.06%
41 366776 371648.00 4872.00 1.3% 0.15% 1.20%
42 27357 28433.00 1076.00 3.8% 0.03% 0.09%
43 104051 125025.00 20974.00 16.8% 0.63% 0.34%
44 451983 470952.00 18969.00 4.0% 0.57% 1.48%
45 73354 76238.00 2884.00 3.8% 0.09% 0.24%
46 1046400 1079188.00 32788.00 3.0% 0.99% 3.42%
47 178880 194186.00 15306.00 7.9% 0.46% 0.58%
48 27387 34418.00 7031.00 20.4% 0.21% 0.09%
49 155176 161278.00 6102.00 3.8% 0.18% 0.51%
50 54130 70199.00 16069.00 22.9% 0.49% 0.18%
51 64830 88190.00 23360.00 26.5% 0.71% 0.21%
52 264365 292072.00 27707.00 9.5% 0.84% 0.86%
53 55687 58406.00 2719.00 4.7% 0.08% 0.18%
54 89641 117883.00 28242.00 24.0% 0.85% 0.29%
55 310434 324737.00 14303.00 4.4% 0.43% 1.02%
56 24588 36217.00 11629.00 32.1% 0.35% 0.08%
57 12873 13592.00 719.00 5.3% 0.02% 0.04%
58 56626 63536.00 6910.00 10.9% 0.21% 0.19%
59 25898 32538.00 6640.00 20.4% 0.20% 0.08%
60 40761 49237.00 8476.00 17.2% 0.26% 0.13%
61 6892 7336.00 444.00 6.1% 0.01% 0.02%
62 182526 199834.00 17308.00 8.7% 0.52% 0.60%
63 48408 71877.00 23469.00 32.7% 0.71% 0.16%
64 105280 133506.00 28226.00 21.1% 0.85% 0.34%
65 96419 100211.00 3792.00 3.8% 0.11% 0.32%
66 62505 68294.00 5789.00 8.5% 0.18% 0.20%
67 59932 62289.00 2357.00 3.8% 0.07% 0.20%
68 142584 172350.00 29766.00 17.3% 0.90% 0.47%
69 188862 196289.00 7427.00 3.8% 0.22% 0.62%
70 6500 6756.00 256.00 3.8% 0.01% 0.02%
71 11711 12249.00 538.00 4.4% 0.02% 0.04%
72 24119 25322.00 1203.00 4.8% 0.04% 0.08%
73 172146 178916.00 6770.00 3.8% 0.20% 0.56%
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74 66749 82837.00 16088.00 19.4% 0.49% 0.22%
75 834303 863642.00 29339.00 3.4% 0.89% 2.73%
76 169779 179369.00 9590.00 5.3% 0.29% 0.56%
77 185795 202486.00 16691.00 8.2% 0.50% 0.61%
78 16351 24356.00 8005.00 32.9% 0.24% 0.05%
79 127107 132590.00 5483.00 4.1% 0.17% 0.42%
80 29494 30653.00 1159.00 3.8% 0.04% 0.10%
81 785373 845594.00 60221.00 7.1% 1.82% 2.57%
82 365208 384916.00 19708.00 5.1% 0.60% 1.19%
83 79899 130239.00 50340.00 38.7% 1.52% 0.26%
84 87244 90675.00 3431.00 3.8% 0.10% 0.29%
85 51983 55433.00 3450.00 6.2% 0.10% 0.17%
86 37954 40184.00 2230.00 5.5% 0.07% 0.12%
87 27961 29060.00 1099.00 3.8% 0.03% 0.09%
88 77363 92875.00 15512.00 16.7% 0.47% 0.25%
89 390763 437114.00 46351.00 10.6% 1.40% 1.28%
90 192142 201681.00 9539.00 4.7% 0.29% 0.63%
91 72236 75472.00 3236.00 4.3% 0.10% 0.24%
92 348702 356959.00 8257.00 2.3% 0.25% 1.14%
93 138439 176639.00 38200.00 21.6% 1.16% 0.45%
94 106062 136054.00 29992.00 22.0% 0.91% 0.35%
95 14878 15463.00 585.00 3.8% 0.02% 0.05%
96 520737 616642.00 95905.00 15.6% 2.90% 1.70%
97 64277 67585.00 3308.00 4.9% 0.10% 0.21%
98 131267 192575.00 61308.00 31.8% 1.85% 0.43%
99 15062 21652.00 6590.00 30.4% 0.20% 0.05%
100 111744 117332.00 5588.00 4.8% 0.17% 0.37%
101 77231 82775.00 5544.00 6.7% 0.17% 0.25%
102 272711 286850.00 14139.00 4.9% 0.43% 0.89%
103 3875 5410.00 1535.00 28.4% 0.05% 0.01%
104 131346 186939.00 55593.00 29.7% 1.68% 0.43%
105 464025 488454.00 24429.00 5.0% 0.74% 1.52%
106 13624 14159.00 535.00 3.8% 0.02% 0.04%
107 703415 1227297.00 523882.00 42.7% 15.85% 2.30%
108 179821 193889.00 14068.00 7.3% 0.43% 0.59%
109 41391 43601.00 2210.00 5.1% 0.07% 0.14%
110 581771 615217.00 33446.00 5.4% 1.01% 1.90%
111 1324116 1396691.00 72575.00 5.2% 2.20% 4.33%
112 97968 153463.00 55495.00 36.2% 1.68% 0.32%
113 230174 239226.00 9052.00 3.8% 0.27% 0.75%
114 469081 478175.00 9094.00 1.9% 0.28% 1.53%
115 344320 349075.00 4755.00 1.4% 0.14% 1.13%
116 158922 228305.00 69383.00 30.4% 2.10% 0.52%
117 23126 24412.00 1286.00 5.3% 0.04% 0.08%
118 167097 155002.00 -12095.00 -7.8% -0.37% 0.55%
119 149137 197558.00 48421.00 24.5% 1.46% 0.49%
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reference Premium healthy difference % saving % of total saving % of cost
120 372185 401073.00 28888.00 7.2% 0.87% 1.22%
121 351380 366116.00 14736.00 4.0% 0.45% 1.15%
122 29490 31511.00 2021.00 6.4% 0.06% 0.10%
123 427881 440849.00 12968.00 2.9% 0.39% 1.40%
124 200153 252880.00 52727.00 20.9% 1.59% 0.65%
125 22145 23016.00 871.00 3.8% 0.03% 0.07%
126 111381 135501.00 24120.00 17.8% 0.73% 0.36%
127 413707 451474.00 37767.00 8.4% 1.14% 1.35%
128 207274 215425.00 8151.00 3.8% 0.25% 0.68%
129 108981 113266.00 4285.00 3.8% 0.13% 0.36%
130 6221 6528.00 307.00 4.7% 0.01% 0.02%
131 8750 9094.00 344.00 3.8% 0.01% 0.03%
132 44068 48752.00 4684.00 9.6% 0.14% 0.14%
133 91738 95345.00 3607.00 3.8% 0.11% 0.30%
134 472166 483103.00 10937.00 2.3% 0.33% 1.54%
135 32822 38749.00 5927.00 15.3% 0.18% 0.11%
136 3184 4292.00 1108.00 25.8% 0.03% 0.01%
137 45489 47278.00 1789.00 3.8% 0.05% 0.15%
138 75958 87698.00 11740.00 13.4% 0.36% 0.25%
139 26607 28250.00 1643.00 5.8% 0.05% 0.09%
140 156683 170010.00 13327.00 7.8% 0.40% 0.51%
141 101866 127847.00 25981.00 20.3% 0.79% 0.33%
142 337982 358599.00 20617.00 5.7% 0.62% 1.11%
143 101444 142768.00 41324.00 28.9% 1.25% 0.33%
144 53761 55875.00 2114.00 3.8% 0.06% 0.18%
145 10766 12907.00 2141.00 16.6% 0.06% 0.04%
146 208828 217040.00 8212.00 3.8% 0.25% 0.68%
147 107010 111218.00 4208.00 3.8% 0.13% 0.35%
148 84730 132593.00 47863.00 36.1% 1.45% 0.28%
149 114054 118923.00 4869.00 4.1% 0.15% 0.37%
150 20652 21464.00 812.00 3.8% 0.02% 0.07%
151 116606 146856.00 30250.00 20.6% 0.92% 0.38%
152 48368 56856.00 8488.00 14.9% 0.26% 0.16%
153 370128 379761.00 9633.00 2.5% 0.29% 1.21%
154 87809 91262.00 3453.00 3.8% 0.10% 0.29%
155 111788 125060.00 13272.00 10.6% 0.40% 0.37%
156 356289 375618.00 19329.00 5.1% 0.58% 1.17%
157 85821 89196.00 3375.00 3.8% 0.10% 0.28%
158 431234 450202.00 18968.00 4.2% 0.57% 1.41%
159 105136 117538.00 12402.00 10.6% 0.38% 0.34%
160 161041 167374.00 6333.00 3.8% 0.19% 0.53%
161 77783 92975.00 15192.00 16.3% 0.46% 0.25%
162 34050 36804.00 2754.00 7.5% 0.08% 0.11%
163 443193 464739.00 21546.00 4.6% 0.65% 1.45%
164 217212 243252.00 26040.00 10.7% 0.79% 0.71%
 totAl 30579616 33885564 3305948.00 9.8% 100.00% 100.00%
source: Partnership.
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Tables 5 and 6 illustrate that, in the DB market, the same sort of enhancements 
are available as in the retail market, although the impact of enhanced rates is 
spread across lives that are in average and in below-average health. The crucial 
difference between the two is that in the case of the retail market, the cost 
benefits accrue to the plan member, while in the DB market, these accrue to the 
scheme. 
3.4 Cost of an enhanced bulk buy-in 
The costs of an enhanced bulk buy-in will vary depending on scheme size and 
complexity. At the larger end of the market, where bespoke deals are arranged 
that frequently involve collateral and/or security features, fees can range 
between £500,000 and more than £1m. Fees will also vary between advisors, 
some of which offer a fixed fee to smaller schemes that includes legal costs. If a 
bulk buy-in does not proceed, the minimum costs to the scheme are the adviser’s 
broking fees, although it may be that legal advice has also been sought and 
must therefore be paid for. 
Having spoken with consultants in this market we understand that the following 
examples are typical for the cost of a bulk buy-in underwritten on a standard 
basis. The lower end of the ranges represents very small transactions:
•	 Broking exercise (obtaining quotes): £10,000 - £100,000 
•	 Legal advice (contracts): £20,000 - £50,000
•	 Transactional costs: £10,000 -£60,000
•	 Implementation costs: £10,000 - £100,000 
For a pensioner bulk buy-in of £10m-£20m, the expected fees might be as 
follows:
•	 Broking exercise: £30,000 
•	 Legal advice: £20,000
•	 Transactional costs: £20,000
•	 Implementation costs: £30,000
These are indicative advisors fees. It should be noted there is also an investment 
of time for both the trustees and sponsoring employer. 
Trustees need to put these costs into context. This is likely to be the largest single 
investment decision they make and once the deal is agreed, there appear to be 
no associated investment expenses during the time that the policy is held as a 
buy-in. We understand that these total costs represent somewhere in the range 
of 0.5% to 1% of the premium paid to the bulk annuity provider.
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4. towards a Consistent regulatory Framework  
and a Code of Practice 
The FSA and tPR need to work together to ensure a clear overarching regulatory 
framework is established for the buy-in and buy-out market. insurance company
There is a relevant analogy between the consumer in the retail annuity market 
and the trustee in the DB scheme market. In both cases, they are seeking to 
take out an insurance contract that is complex (relative to their respective levels 
of knowledge), for which they might have no learning curve, and which is 
usually irreversible.  Therefore, although trustees are legally responsible for the 
actions they take, arguably, in practice, the onus for good governance and due 
diligence falls on the industry – under the supervision of the regulators – due to 
the asymmetry in information between the buy and sell sides. This is particularly 
important given that the current market focus for enhanced bulk buy-ins is 
smaller schemes which, as tPR has noted, frequently lack the expertise and 
governance structures associated with larger schemes.
Here we summarise the concerns that arose in the course of the research and 
we offer proposals which the regulators and industry might consider in relation 
to regulation and the development of a code of practice designed to ensure that 
the market progresses in a safe and orderly manner and is fair and transparent 
for all parties concerned. We suggest that trustees, employers and scheme 
members will have more confidence if the various parties to the transaction 
agree to adhere to such a code, which we suggest might be agreed between  
the government, the regulators and stakeholders to the market. 
While we would expect the industry to develop the code of practice, it is 
important that this initiative is informed by the government and also by the 
regulators, which might provide similar guidance, with consistent messaging, on 
their websites. A clear and consistent regulatory approach to the market would 
provide a firm foundation for the code. 
4.1 The regulation of the enhanced buy-in market
The FSA (from April 2013 the FCA and PRA) regulates the insurance 
companies that operate in the BPA and retail annuity markets. This regulation 
includes solvency and capital adequacy requirements. The Financial Services 
Compensation Scheme (FSCS) covers defaults irrespective of whether the 
annuities are held by a scheme or in the name of individual ex-members. 
However, an enhanced bulk buy-in applies DC solutions to DB schemes, which 
are regulated by tPR. This means that many of the processes operate under 
a dual regulatory system, which becomes tripartite in April 2013. Areas of 
overlap include where trustees purchase annuities via a bulk buy-in (including 
individually underwritten contracts) and where they purchase annuities that are 
assigned to individual members, either through individual exercises or a bulk 
buy-out. The former exercise falls within tPR’s remit, while the latter exercise 
represents a discharge of the scheme’s liabilities in relation to the individual 
member’s guaranteed income payments, which crosses into FSA/FCA/PRA 
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territory. This means that trustees are dealing with multiple rule books, which are 
further influenced by European legislation, such as Solvency II. Trustees – and/
or their advisers – need to be experts in a complex and constantly changing 
regulatory environment. 
The regulation of advice is equally confusing. Advice to employers and trustees 
is not regulated by tPR and the FSA (even though most firms of consultants 
are FSA-regulated). However, where trustees arrange individual annuities 
in members’ names, through TPIE exercises for example, this is considered 
to be FSA territory, although as the code of practice on incentive exercise 
demonstrates, tPR takes a keen interest in such procedures, as does the 
government. 
The FSA has a memorandum of understanding with tPR,23 which originally 
aimed to set out the processes for cooperation and coordination between 
the two regulators in relation to DB and DC pensions, and which set out the 
ways in which they were to collaborate on guidance, policy and standards. 
The memorandum states that ‘the application to pension schemes of each 
regulator’s governing legislation will, so far as possible, be complementary and 
transparent’. 
The agreement was published in 2005 and has been updated once, in 2007, 
which means it pre-dates the development of the de-risking market. It comes as 
no surprise, therefore, that it makes no mention of the use of bulk annuities in 
DB de-risking exercises. We suggest that this oversight might be addressed:
recommendation 1:  
the memorandum of understanding between the FsA and tPr should be 
updated to incorporate the different regulatory systems that apply in the 
case of enhanced bulk buy-ins. this is particularly urgent in the light of 
the move away from a single financial services regulator (FsA) in 2013 
to a regime where two separate regulators address conduct (FCA) and 
prudential (PrA) issues, respectively.
4.2 Accurate data 
There is a need for accurate data at both the macro and micro levels.
At the macro-level, our research indicates that different sources of buy-in market 
data are inconsistent. tPR reports with a lag on de-risking activity through the 
Purple Book, while market participants – insurers and, in particular, consultants 
– publish reports periodically that present quite different figures on the number 
and size of transactions. 
An orderly market requires clear and consistent data. This, in turn, requires a 
central source of data that draws on the experience of all market participants 
(although such participants might provide such data on an anonymised basis). 
Importantly, for trustees and employers to appreciate the financial risks they are 
taking when they embark on an enhanced bulk buy-in process, there needs to 
23 http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/mou/fsa_tpr.pdf 
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be accurate data on the proportion of deals that reach a successful conclusion 
and the proportion that fail, with analysis of the reasons for the latter.
At the micro-level, equally essential to the success of the market is the insurer’s 
access to members’ medical data, which in turn requires member cooperation 
and motivation. Enhanced underwriting techniques have only been available 
to DB schemes for about 12 months, yet already there are three different 
approaches evident. 
recommendation 2:  
Clear and consistent data are a prerequisite for an orderly market. this is 
an issue the regulators need to address jointly. data should include the 
number and size of deals and examples of case studies that demonstrate 
the ways in which an enhanced bulk buy-in can lead to scheme savings. 
data should also include examples of cases that do not lead to any 
savings following the medical underwriting exercise. in particular, it is 
essential to capture the percentage of enhanced bulk buy-in deals that 
reach a satisfactory conclusion and the percentage which fail relative to 
conventional buy-ins, including the reasons for failure and the associated 
scheme costs. 
recommendation 3:  
Collaboration between competing insurers – including the sharing of 
early quantitative and qualitative statistical experience in the market in 
relation to underwriting techniques and member data collection – should 
be a priority.
4.3 Flexibility in member data collection processes
For a competitive market to develop, trustees and their advisers need insurers 
to be flexible, so that they can select the best underwriting approach and data 
collection method for the scheme profile. This would avoid the situation whereby 
trustees are forced to pre-select an insurer that uses only one underwriting and 
data-collection process.
recommendation 4:  
insurers should be encouraged to develop a flexible approach to 
underwriting and member data collection to  enable schemes to 
benefit from a whole-of-market bidding process. trustees and advisers 
need clear information on the relative methods available and on any 
restrictions in insurers’ models.
4.4 Trustee disclosure 
An important concern raised by interviewees was that trustees, knowingly 
or unwittingly, might not disclose facts material to the underwriting process, 
particularly where current or previous de-risking exercises have involved an 
element of medical underwriting. We understand that the result of this lack of 
disclosure could lead to future legal disputes, whereby conventional insurers sue 
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the trustees for damages due to the fact that they underwrote contracts in the 
absence of certain material facts.
Insurance law is quite specific in terms of the buyer’s obligation to disclose 
all material facts – even if no specific questions are asked.24 While the legal 
process in relation to disputes in contract law takes into account the potential for 
consumer misunderstanding, it is likely to be less lenient in relation to employers 
and trustees, who are advised by consultants and lawyers. 
At present, it seems that the onus rests with insurers to ask questions of the 
trustees to determine if any previous bulk or individual de-risking activities might 
affect the risk profile of the scheme. 
recommendation 5:  
trustee disclosure of material facts should form part of the code of good 
practice. to avoid anti-selection concerns on the part of conventional 
insurers, trustees should be required to complete a standard disclosure 
form that captures all previous de-risking exercises, including failed as 
well as successful transactions. An important issue to resolve is whether 
full disclosure of medical information is required where the data were 
obtained by an enhanced underwriter.
We anticipate that the potential problem of anti-disclosure will disappear over 
time, as conventional insurers develop their own medical underwriting processes, 
which would mean that all insurers would obtain a clear medical profile of the 
pensioner cohort. 
4.5 Standard procedures on the death of an annuitant
A specific issue for insurers is the procedure trustees adopt when a member 
for whom they have arranged an annuity – as part of a bulk arrangement 
held as a scheme asset – dies. Particular issues arise if the scheme that holds 
a bulk annuity as an asset enters the PPF. An ABI and NAPF report published 
in September 2011, ‘Bulk Insured Pensions: A Good Practice Guide’25 said ‘the 
trustees may want to ensure that the bulk buy-in policy caters for the possibility 
of the scheme entering a PPF assessment period’. We endorse this approach and 
suggest that it be made standard practice.
recommendation 6:  
A standard procedure for trustee disclosure on the death of a member 
for whom they hold an annuity – or whose life forms part of a bulk buy-
in annuity – would save administrative time on the part of the scheme 
24 The academic and professional literature on this subject is vast and it is not the purpose of 
this report to interrogate insurance contract law. We consulted, among other documents, http://
lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/ICL1_Misrepresentation_and_Non-disclosure.pdf, http://
lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/cp182_ICL_Misrep_Non-disclosure_Breach_of_Warranty.pdf, 
http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/ombudsman-news/46/46_non_disclosure_
insurance.htm, http://legal.practitioner.com/regulation/standards_9_3_1.htm,
25 http://www.abi.org.uk/Publications/58274.pdf 
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and the insurance company and would prevent the situation whereby the 
insurer had to reclaim funds. 
recommendation 7:  
trustees should consider the possibility of entering the PPF when they 
arrange buy-ins so that the responsibility for informing insurance 
companies of the change of ownership and of the death of annuitants is 
formally transferred.  
special attention should be paid to trustees responsibilities during the 
assessment period before formal entry to the PPF. 
The ABI and NAPF report already covers this point as follows:
During an assessment period trustees must be [able to] reduce benefits to the level 
of compensation the PPF would pay. For a buy-in, it is common to specify within 
the policy terms what happens should a PPF assessment period begin, otherwise the 
policy will pay at the full rate of benefits whilst the trustees are permitted to only pay 
at the reduced PPF levels. Options include allowing the full or partial surrender of 
the policy or applying the surplus to other scheme purposes. (43)
4.6 Expertise of trustees, employers and their advisers 
As expert advice and a clear understanding of all available options is very important 
– it should also be in the interests of the trustees to be well informed and not have to 
rely on their advisors’ recommendations blindly. (ABi and NAPF 6)
Clearly, the trustees require expert independent professional advice to ensure 
they have considered fully the opportunities and risks of an enhanced bulk 
buy-in, but as the above quotation indicates, the trustees need a high level of 
knowledge in order to choose their advisers carefully. As noted earlier in this 
report, evidence from tPR indicates that trustee knowledge and understanding 
can be poor among smaller schemes. This, we suggest, makes them potentially 
vulnerable.
recommendation 8:  
trustees should seek independent and impartial advice concerning any 
proposed enhanced bulk buy-in. it is essential that they understand 
any potential liabilities that they face if the insured benefits purchased 
are insufficient to meet the scheme benefits payable. they should also 
consider some form of trustee liability insurance. 
recommendation 9:  
tPr should incorporate enhanced bulk buy-ins in its trustee knowledge 
& Understanding (tkU) course and on the website in general. the 
information should also be made available via links from the FCA and 
PrA websites.
It’s not just trustees who require a high level of knowledge and understanding. 
This point equally applies to employers and to the advisers they and the trustees 
appoint for a BPA exercise. Moreover, given that insurers’ appetite for enhanced 
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BPAs – initially at least – is focused on smaller company schemes, where local 
and regional advisers might be involved, it is essential that these firms have 
access to the expertise required to transact secure deals in a market that is 
complex and changing. Without this expertise there is a greater likelihood of 
deals failing or being transacted in a sub-optimal manner.
recommendation 10:  
the industry should work with the regulators to produce a dedicated 
trustee and employer guide to enhanced bulk buy-ins. this should build 
on the existing ABi/NAPF guide and be updated annually to incorporate 
emerging data and case studies. All advisers – particularly the smaller 
firms – require access to a source of impartial information and guidance. 
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5. Conclusions and Next steps
We hope that this report will stimulate debate among all stakeholders in the 
de-risking market and that it will help to foster an efficient and transparent 
market that will ensure access to more affordable bulk buy-ins for trustees and 
employers through the application of medical underwriting techniques.
As with any new market that involves complex underwriting techniques, we 
believe that it is essential for the industry and regulators to work together to 
ensure trustees, corporate sponsors and scheme members are fully protected 
from the perceived and potentially unforeseen consequences of transactions that 
are intended to lead ultimately to a full buy-out.
In due course, we expect to see the enhanced bulk buy-in market expand as 
new and existing players develop medical underwriting expertise for schemes 
of all sizes and not just the smaller schemes targeted initially by the current 
participants. In due course, we also anticipate that there might be acquisitions 
among insurers, as major players seek to acquire the medical underwriting 
expertise they require to compete. The potential for instability in the market, 
therefore, is significant.
For the market to gain the confidence of trustees and employers and to meet 
what we expect to be a rapidly growing demand, we have made two key 
recommendations. The first is that the regulators collaborate to ensure that the 
shared territory between tPR, the FCA and the PRA is governed with consistency 
and rigour in relation to pensions and insurance law. This might require 
government oversight. We suggest that the days when the DC and DB markets 
operated as discrete entities are long gone and that the introduction of medically 
underwritten bulk annuities is just the latest in a series of emerging areas of 
concern, where the boundaries between what was once an institutional/retail 
divide have become porous.
The second key recommendation – to develop a code of practice for enhanced 
bulk buy-ins – requires the collaboration of all stakeholders, in particular, the 
insurers, the consultants, the reinsurers, the insurance company analysts, and 
the pension lawyers. This follows naturally from our first recommendation, which 
deals with the potential problems that can arise where trust and contract law 
interact in a new multi-billion pound market and where at stake is the future of 
the private sector employers currently burdened with DB scheme deficits.
To take these recommendations forward, the Pensions Institute proposes to 
facilitate the initial discussions between the government, the regulators, and all 
interested stakeholders through a series of industry debates and the formation of 
a working group and steering committee to develop the code of practice. In the 
meantime, we welcome your feedback to this report.
Debbie Harrison (dr.debbie.harrison@gmail.com)  
and David Blake (d.blake@city.ac.uk) 
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Glossary of terms  
Bulk buy-in (conventional): Trustees buy a bulk annuity policy from an insurer, 
as an asset of the scheme, to provide a ‘shadow’ payroll or payment facility 
that matches exactly the retirement incomes of the designated pensioner section 
(bulk buy-ins normally only cover pensioners in the scheme). The exercise 
provides a complete hedge for interest rates, inflation, the potential shortfall in 
yield on pension scheme assets, and the cost of insuring longevity risk. The bulk 
annuity is held in the trustees’ names on behalf of the scheme. The insurer might 
take on responsibility for administration of the members and their benefits, but, 
more typically, this remains with the scheme.  As with a bulk buy-out, a single 
exercise can accommodate all pensioners, or the trustees might arrange a series 
of transactions to deal with different tranches of retired members. 
Bulk buy-in (enhanced): As per the conventional bulk buy-in, but here the 
trustees buy a bulk annuity, as an asset of the scheme that reflects the health 
and lifestyle of individual pensioners. The medical underwriting might relate 
to all of the pensioners or only to the high-liability members, in which case the 
rest of the members are underwritten on standard terms by the same insurer. 
By taking member-specific mortality assumptions into consideration, the cost of 
the enhanced bulk buy-in might be considerably lower than the bulk standard 
annuity.  
Bulk buy-out: The pension scheme – which is almost always closed to both 
new members and future accrual – transfers (and discharges responsibility 
for) the scheme’s entire liability for benefit payments in relation to a group of 
scheme members, usually complete schemes, including deferred pensioners 
and pensioners. In return for receiving a fixed sum or premium from the 
pension scheme, the insurer issues individual annuity policies for the designated 
members. These members cease to be beneficiaries of the scheme because 
benefits are secured in full under the insurance policies. The pension trust 
remains in place for any remaining scheme members. The bulk buy-out can 
accommodate all pensioners in a single exercise or the trustees can arrange a 
series of transactions to deal with different tranches of pensioners.
deferred annuities: The trustees pay a premium to secure a guaranteed annuity 
rate for members when they reach the normal retirement age (as defined by the 
pension scheme benefits). However, members retain the option to select early 
or late retirement, to commute part of their pension for a tax-free lump sum at 
retirement, and to transfer their benefits to an alternative pension arrangement. 
enhanced transfer value (etV): An ETV allows deferred members to transfer 
out of the scheme in exchange for a statutory amount plus an enhancement 
in respect of the pension given up, usually funded by the employer. ETVs are 
covered by the June 2012 code of practice on incentive exercises that resulted 
from a government-led industry initiative.26
longevity swap: The pension scheme pays a fixed set of cash flows to the 
counterparty, based on the projected mortality rates for the designated scheme 
members (where the projections are made at the start of the swap). In return, 
26  http://www.incentiveexercises.org.uk   
A healthier way to de-risk 53
it receives cash flows based on realised mortality rates (with reference to either 
named scheme members or a wider population) at the time the cash flows 
take place. The objective is to match as closely as possible the cash flows the 
scheme receives from the counterparty with the required pensioner payments. A 
perceived attraction of swaps is that they enable schemes to hedge risk without 
the capital investment involved in the purchase of a bulk buy-out or bulk buy-
in. The strategy, which was first used in 2008, is considered suitable for larger 
schemes, with typical deals representing liabilities of about £1bn. Scale is 
important, due to the complexity of contract terms, which can be expensive to 
negotiate and sustain, together with the counterparty’s requirement for robust 
historical longevity data for risk assessment purposes, among other factors. 
However, it should be noted that one major insurer is thought to be able to 
offer longevity swaps for much smaller deals. With regards to interest rate and 
inflation rate swaps, these are viable for well below £1bn of liabilities and are 
potentially available to relatively small sizes of liabilities through pooled LDI 
(liability-driven investing) investments.
Pension increase exchange (Pie): A PIE exercise can be undertaken for scheme 
members where their pensions are already in payment and where they remain 
members of the scheme. A PIE gives pensioner members the option to exchange 
their non-statutory pension increases for a higher immediate income that is 
not inflation-linked. In theory, a PIE can be of significant benefit to members 
in poor health, where the higher immediate income is of more value than 
future increases. For the scheme, PIE exercises can help to simplify complex 
and variable indexation rights, such as Limited Price Indexation, which can be 
expensive to match with a bulk annuity due to the lack of a perfect hedging 
instrument. It is thought that PIE exercises can reduce the cost of a bulk buy-in. 
PIE exercises involve impartial advice or guidance to the individual member to 
ensure that the indexation exchange terms are fair and that the decision is fully 
understood. PIEs are classed as ‘modification’ exercises in the June 2012 code of 
practice on incentive exercises.
total Pension increase exchange (tPie): A TPIE is an exercise offered to 
scheme members who are not yet in receipt of a pension, and are typically aged 
55-65 (55 being the earliest age when a pension can be paid via an individual 
annuity; 65 being the typical normal scheme pension age). TPIE exercises 
give non-pensioner members in this age bracket the option to take an early 
retirement pension, usually by transferring the value of their pension to secure 
an immediate annuity in the shape and form that the member desires. Medical 
underwriting can result in an enhanced level of income for the member as well 
as the choice of income shape which might, for example, exclude a spouse’s 
pension where the member is unmarried. The scheme benefits from the transfer 
of the member’s liability to an insurance company. All transfers out of a scheme 
require the member to receive impartial advice. TPIEs are covered by the June 
2012 code of practice for incentive exercises.  
Vesting arrangements: Here trustees secure annuity premiums in advance of 
the date deferred members reach retirement. The rates are based on socio-
demographic assumptions that will enable future retirees to be accommodated 
by the buy-in provider. This is a vesting arrangement to secure tranches of 
members under buy-ins in the future, ‘mopping up’ retirees when there is 
sufficient economies of scale to do so, but, as with much of the pricing basis, 
locked down with the insurer upon signing the initial agreement, leaving 
primarily the discount rate underlying the pricing as the only variable to be 
decided at the time.
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sponsor statement by Partnership Assurance 
Partnership is delighted to co-sponsor the Pensions Institute report ‘A healthier 
way to de-risk: The introduction of medical underwriting to the defined benefit 
de-risking market’ having pioneered the development of the enhanced buy-in 
market in the UK.
Partnership is a specialist provider of financial solutions for people with health 
and lifestyle conditions, as well as those suffering from a serious medical 
impairment. To date, our primary focus been impaired and enhanced annuities.
Through individual underwriting Partnership is able to offer those with a reduced 
life expectancy an increased income in retirement. With research showing that 
more than 50% of people at retirement are able to qualify for an enhancement, 
this is a market that has experienced considerable growth in recent years.
Partnership is an expert in the field of medical underwriting and believes that the 
in-house data set it has accumulated over 17 years is market leading.
Partnership believes that its years of accumulated data and knowledge give 
it an unrivalled understanding of the impact of health and lifestyle choices 
on longevity. This is critical to our success and enables us to make  accurate 
estimates in relation to life expectancy. Partnership is one of the fastest growing 
UK insurers, as evidenced by being Number 1 in both the 2011 Sunday Times 
HSBC Top Track 250 annual league table and the 2012 Sunday Times Deloitte 
Buyout Track 100.
Our most recent development is in the area of defined benefit de-risking. This is 
particularly the case for smaller company pension schemes, which traditionally 
have had limited access to de-risking solutions, where we have been able to 
demonstrate how the cost of insuring liabilities can be reduced by taking into 
account the specific health and lifestyle of individual members.
We believe this report will be an important step in helping to build awareness 
of the innovation taking place in respect of enhanced de-risking. We welcome 
the proposal around the development of a code of practice and look forward 
to working with key stakeholders across the market to establish how individual 
underwriting can be embedded into de-risking exercises.
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sponsor statement By Jlt Pension Capital strategies
JLT Pension Capital Strategies (JLT PCS) is pleased to co-sponsor this report 
which examines the development of the enhanced buy-in market and the 
associated implications.
JLT PCS has a long and well-established reputation for guiding clients with 
defined benefit pension schemes through de-risking transactions, from the 
initial contact with insurers, to negotiating terms and the signing of contracts 
and placing business with all major buy-in/buy-out providers. Our team has 
completed in excess of 50 buy-in and buy-out transactions, ranging in size from 
below £1m to in excess of £500m, covering deal structures from conventional 
bulk annuities to fully bespoke de-risking solutions.
The bulk annuity market continues to evolve and develop; we see underwritten 
(enhanced) bulk annuities as an important step forward for smaller pensioner 
buy-in transactions, by which we mean transactions involving up to 400 
pensioner members.
In 2012 the first two insurers to formally enter the enhanced bulk annuity 
marketplace were first Partnership Assurance, early in 2012, and then Just 
Retirement, towards the end of 2012. These new entrants to the buy-in market 
bring a refined approach to the pricing of risk and, importantly, they bring 
additional capacity for deals to be written, which should enable the market to 
continue to expand and develop. 
Importantly, due to the underwriting processes deployed by these new entrants, 
together with the potential for further new entrants which may adopt alternative 
processes, a new way of managing and running the competitive broking 
process will need to be developed in order to ensure an efficient and effective 
bulk annuity exercise is carried out on behalf of pension scheme trustees and 
sponsors.
We believe this report represents the catalyst for the drive towards these new 
broking processes.
JLT PCS looks forward to supporting the future development of a code of best 
practice for this market.
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About the Pensions institute
The objectives of the Pensions Institute are:
•	  to undertake high quality research in all fields related to pensions
•	  to communicate the results of that research to the academic and practitioner 
community
•	  to establish an international network of pensions researchers from a variety 
of disciplines
•	  to provide expert independent advice to the pensions industry and 
government.
We take a fully multidisciplinary approach. For the first time disciplines such as 
economics, finance, insurance, and actuarial science through to accounting, 
corporate governance, law and regulation have been brought together in order 
to enhance strategic thinking, research and teaching in pensions. As the first and 
only UK academic research centre focused entirely on pensions, the Pensions 
Institute unites some of the world’s leading experts in these fields in order to 
offer an integrated approach to the complex problems that arise in this field.  
The Pensions Institute undertakes research in a wide range of fields, including:
Pension microeconomics
The economics of individual and corporate pension planning, long term savings 
and retirement decisions.
Pension fund management and performance
The investment management and investment performance of occupational and 
personal pension schemes.
Pension funding and valuations
The actuarial and insurance issues related to pension schemes, including risk 
management, asset liability management, funding, scheme design, annuities, 
and guarantees.
Pension law and regulation
The legal aspects of pension schemes and pension fund management.
Pension accounting, taxation and administration
The operational aspects of running pension schemes.
Marketing
The practice and ethics of selling group and individual pension products.
Macroeconomics of pensions
The implications of aggregate pension savings and the impact of the size and 
maturity of pension funds on other sectors of the economy (e.g. corporate, 
public and international sectors).
Public policy
Domestic and EU social policy towards pension provision and other employee 
benefits in the light of factors such as the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty 
and the demographic developments in Europe and other countries. 
Research disseminated by the Pensions Institute may include views on policy 
but the Pensions Institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. For more 
details, see: pensions-institute.org
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